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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the strategies used by the chemical industry to delay, weaken, and prevent 
governmental regulation of industrial chemicals that pose a threat to public health. By analyzing 
industry engagement in regulatory processes since the 1960s, twelve different strategies have 
been identified that have contributed to the successful delay or weakening of policy outcomes. 
Using endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) as a case study, this thesis further demonstrates 
how industry strategies are coordinated and employed in a synergistic manner.  
 
The strategies that have been identified in this paper are divided into three categories; (1) 
industry engagement in science, (2) industry engagement with the public, and (3) industry 
engagement with politics. By examining how individual strategies build off each other and are 
combined to achieve desired policy outcomes, this thesis demonstrates how the chemical 
industry’s current strategy on EDCs follows an elaborate playbook that has been developed and 
improved over years of regulatory engagement. 
 
Human exposure to industrial chemicals often results in adverse health effects that are gradual, 
ambiguous, and poorly understood. It is the complexity and uncertainty of chemical exposure 
science that allows industry to successfully carry out obstructive strategies and avoid public 
accountability. By framing the behavior of the chemicals industry in a context of violence, this 
thesis asserts that there are direct human health costs that result from obstructive engagement in 
regulatory processes. 
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1. Project Description 
 
The large scale production of industrial chemicals first began during the industrial revolution and 
steadily expanded over the course of the 20th century. Since the advent of industrial chemistry, 
doctors and health scientists have been playing a game of “catch up,” trying to understand how 
the widespread dispersal of many of these chemicals can affect human health. For some 
chemicals, the effects of human exposure are immediate and obvious. However for many of 
these chemicals, the negative effects of exposure are neither immediate nor visual, often 
emerging only years or decades after initial exposure. Over the past century, these types of 
substances have proven to be a major challenge to human societies, posing a unique set of 
difficulties for authorities who are tasked with protecting the public from such threats. From 
leaded gasoline to asbestos, benzene and PCBs, the 20th century is riddled with stories that 
document the difficulties that regulatory authorities have faced when trying to control chemical 
exposures that pose complex, ambiguous, and accretive health risks.  
 
Much of the difficulty associated with the regulation of chemical exposure can be linked to the 
behavior of industry groups whose profits are tied to the continual production and sale of 
chemical products. When it comes to environmental exposure hazards, there is nearly always a 
substantial delay that occurs between the discovery of the hazard and the regulation of that 
hazard. When science determines that a certain chemical may pose a threat to human health, a 
regulatory process unfolds in which industry actors tend to employ strategies that are intended to 
prevent or delay regulation from occurring. Over the past century, the chemicals industry has 
developed a dynamic set of strategies that continue to be adapted to fit new regulatory battles in 
many different governance contexts. In many cases, these strategies have proven to be extremely 
effective, successfully preventing regulatory measures from being adopted for decades. 
 
However the success of these strategies has also come with a real human cost. By prolonging the 
production and sale of harmful substances, these strategies exacerbate the damage caused by 
chemical exposure, leading to increasing rates of cancers, respiratory conditions, endocrine 
disorders, and the slow and gradual onset of other illnesses associated with long term chemical 
exposures. Because of this, the use of obstructive strategies in regulatory processes can be 
interpreted as acts of slow violence, in which the somatic damage caused by industry behavior is 
gradual and accretive, occurring over timelines than span decades.  
 
1.1 Research Question and Research Objective 
 
This aim of this thesis is to identify and analyze the obstructive strategies that have been 
developed and employed by the chemicals industry in order to counter regulatory processes. 
Through a historical analysis of regulatory efforts over the course of the 20th century and 
beyond, this thesis hopes to show that the current behavior of the global chemicals industry is 
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best understood through a historical lens, and that the strategies that are currently employed by 
industry groups have been developed and honed through a century of industry engagement in 
regulatory processes. By understanding how industry groups have behaved in regulatory 
processes surrounding lead, asbestos, benzene, PCBs, DDT, and more, this thesis hopes to shine 
light on the current behavior of the chemicals industry concerning the ongoing struggle to 
regulate endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs). Therefore, the research question that this thesis 
explores is: What are the strategies that have been developed by the chemicals industry to 
influence the regulation of substances that cause slow and ambiguous forms of harm, and how 
have these strategies been adapted for use in the current regulatory struggle over EDCs?” 
 
A common proverb, sometimes attributed to Winston Churchill, George Santayana, Edmond 
Burke and others, warns that “he who does not learn from history is doomed to repeat it.” In the 
case of chemical regulation, relatively little public learning has taken place over the past century, 
and the ability of industry groups to exert influence over regulatory processes remains as 
powerful today as ever. Therefore, one goal of this thesis is to contribute to a process of public 
learning by asserting that the obstructive actions of the chemicals industry in regulatory 
processes comprise a form of unethical behavior that is best understood in a framework of 
violence. In academia, many scholars tend to shy away from taking a moral or ethical stance in 
their analyses, believing that to do so would comprise a breach of impartiality. However the 
discipline of Global Studies allows scholars to study complex concepts from a wide number of 
angles and perspectives, shining light on issues in ways that imply moral reasoning. By 
employing the concept of “slow violence” as a theoretical lens, this thesis does just that, 
exposing the human health consequences of chemical industry obstructionism in regulatory 
processes. 
 
Slow violence, chemical exposure, and regulatory engagement represent concepts that largely 
exist outside of the realm of public knowledge. As a result, most victims of chemical exposure 
do not recognize that their failing health may be the direct result of unethical business behaviors 
that places a higher value on profit than on human health. In general, it is this lack of public 
understanding that enables corporations to continue to employ obstructive strategies in 
regulatory processes with little to no public accountability for their actions. By taking an ethical 
stance and framing industry behavior as a form of violence, one objective of this thesis is to 
increase awareness of chemical exposure and to assert that the chemicals industry should be held 
accountable for their behavior in regulatory processes. 
 
1.2 Methodology and Source Materials 
 
Because this study seeks to connect the past to the present, the bulk of this thesis involves a 
historical analysis of a series of case studies, through which the strategies that have been 
developed and employed by the chemical industry in regulatory processes are identified and 
cataloged. Thus the primary method used in this thesis is a historical method, in which chemical 
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industry engagement in regulatory processes is the subject of inquiry. Although industry 
engagement in regulatory processes spans back to the industrial revolution, this thesis will focus 
primarily on industry engagement in the United States and Europe since the 1960s, when the 
publication of Silent Spring led to a substantial shift in chemical industry behavior vis a vis 
regulatory processes.  
 
Although most scholars who examine chemical regulations tend to focus on individual case 
studies, examining specific substances under specific regulatory frameworks, this study seeks to 
step back and look at the behavior of an entire industry. Rather than relying on a rigidly defined 
set of substances or regulatory efforts, this study instead uses the history of chemical regulation 
since the 1960s as a foundation from which are drawn multiple examples of obstructive 
engagement in regulatory process in both the United States and Europe. The individual cases that 
are incorporated in the analysis have been identified through a careful reading of regulatory 
histories, relying on monographs, edited volumes, individual articles and journal issues devoted 
to the history of chemical regulations. Notable volumes include Harremöes et al (2013); Graham, 
Greene & Roberts (1991); Markowitz & Rosner (2013); McGarity & Wagner (2008); Michaels 
(2005); Collins (2010); and Egilman & Bohme (2005). Through these and other volumes, the 
regulatory history of a wide range of substances have been identified and included in the analysis 
presented in this thesis. These include but are not limited to lead, asbestos, benzene, PCBs, 
dioxins, CFCs, vinyl chloride, beryllium, MTBE, BPA, phthalates, styrene, DDT, arsenic, and 
formaldehyde. Each of these cases has been identified and incorporated into the thesis because 
they represent scenarios where industry groups have taken action to counter regulatory efforts. 
Although the regulatory histories of each of these substances have been analyzed in turn, due to 
space constraints, they are not all granted equal weight within the analysis presented in this 
thesis. This ambitious selection of case studies is intended to lend weight to the assertion made in 
this thesis that industry engagement in regulatory processes tends to follow a similar script, 
involving the use of a well-established set of strategies that are easily adapted to new regulatory 
battles.  
 
The findings that are presented in this thesis build off of an extensive collection of secondary 
sources that document the regulatory histories of individual substances, as well as primary source 
documents, such as internal communications and meeting minutes of the chemical industry that 
were made public through lawsuits, tort litigation, and leaks. One database of documents that has 
proven particularly valuable to this thesis is the Chemical Industry Archive, an extensive 
searchable collection of secret industry and government documents collected by the NGO 
Environmental Working Group (EWG), which includes 27,000 pages of meeting minutes from 
chemical industry trade association groups; 10,000 pages of documents from Monsanto, Union 
Carbide, B.F. Goodrich, and other companies involved in the production of vinyl chloride; 
30,000 pages of documents on perfluorinated compounds; as well as thousands of pages of 
industry documents related to PCBs, dioxins, beryllium, arsenic, and MTBE. Other primary 
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documents that focus on EDCs were obtained thanks to the work of investigative journalists, 
including Stephane Horel of Le Monde and Corporate Europe Observatory, and Meg Kissinger 
and Susanne Rust of the Journal-Sentinel. Still more primary documents concerning industry 
engagement with regulatory agencies have been obtained as the result of transparency laws, such 
as the U.S. Government in the Sunshine Act, which requires that meetings and communication 
between regulatory agencies and corporations be made available to the public. 
 
By analyzing regulatory histories and identifying the strategies used by industry groups in their 
engagement with regulatory processes, it becomes clear that there are many commonalities 
between different regulatory efforts, and that industry engagement tends to follow very similar 
paths, no matter the substance under consideration. This thesis thus asserts that the behavior of 
the chemicals industry is best examined through an approach that examines the behavior of the 
industry as a whole, as opposed to an approach that focuses on a single chemical substance or 
industry engagement with a single regulatory agency. Through this approach, it has been 
identified that industry engagement in regulatory processes can be understood as having a 
tripartite structure, involving engagement with science, the public, and politics. Furthermore, 
many interdependencies have been identified between each of these three forms of engagement, 
and it has been found that many individual strategies interact and overlap with each other. In this 
thesis, a total of twelve individual strategies have been identified through a careful reading of the 
histories of individual regulatory efforts, as well as from broader studies that explore the 
behavior of firms in regulatory process. Although this list is not exhaustive, these twelve 
different strategies were each found in multiple different regulatory struggles, and as such, can 
be seen as some of the central strategies that exist within a larger industry playbook.  
 
1.3 Structure 
 
The first three chapters of this thesis be seen as introductory chapters, providing the reader with a 
historical and theoretical basis for understanding the concepts that this thesis deals with. In order 
to create a tangible understanding of the problem that this thesis hopes to shine light on, the next 
chapter introduces the concepts of slow violence and chemical exposure, drawing on the four 
regulatory histories of lead, asbestos, benzene, and PCBs. These stories are intended to 
demonstrate what a typical regulatory history looks like, and also to paint a picture of the types 
of effects that the unregulated dispersal of harmful chemicals can have on human societies. By 
demonstrating that the exacerbation of chemical exposure through regulatory obstructionism 
comprises a form of slow violence, this chapter accentuates the fact that there are victims and 
real human costs associated with industry engagement in regulatory processes. Chapter 3 
introduces the body of theory that this thesis will build off, presenting the regulatory process and 
examining different theoretical models and concepts that help to explain how regulatory 
processes unfold. In particular, this section introduces the concept the science-policy interface, 
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examining many of the unique characteristics associated with risk regulation as well as the 
difficulties that are posed by complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. 
 
The meat of the thesis begins with Chapter 4, which identifies and outlines the strategies that 
have been developed and honed by the chemical industry to delay, prevent, or weaken 
regulation. Dealing with industry engagement with science, the public and politics, chapter four 
is divided into three different sections, each further broken into subsections that examine each 
individual strategy and it’s dependencies in turn. Chapter 5 examines industry efforts 
surrounding EDCs, and is intended to show how industry groups combine different strategies in 
a single regulatory effort in order to delay, weaken, and prevent policy outcomes. This chapter 
will demonstrate how the fundamental strategies that were used in the earlier regulatory struggles 
over lead, benzene, asbestos, and other hazardous substances are still being used today in the 
regulatory struggles over EDCs. In this section it will become clear that by updating and honing 
their strategies over the course of the 20th century, the chemicals industry has developed a 
powerful and effective system for countering regulatory efforts. The final chapter will examine 
the implications of these strategies.  
 
2. Introduction: Slow Violence and Chemical Exposure 
 
In an era characterized by war and terrorism, interpretations of the notion of “violence” have 
become relatively narrow, encompassing mostly the immediate and visual. This thesis however, 
will address what can be referred to as “slow violence,” borrowing the term from Robert Nixon 
(2011), who describes forms of violence that are typically invisible and that cause slow and 
gradual damage to individuals over the course of years, decades, or even generations. In his work 
Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Nixon (2011) describes it as “a violence 
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across 
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (p. 2). 
Although the term is used to describe a broad range of environmental hazards, from nuclear 
contamination to climate change, this thesis will borrow the term and use it as an analytical tool 
for better understanding the types of negative health effects that are associated with the dispersal 
of certain industrial chemicals in the human environment. 
 
Although not traditionally framed in the context of violence, chemical exposure has been a social 
problem since even before the advent of industrial capitalism, leading to countless diagnoses and 
undiagnosed variations of cancer, asthma, birth defects, organ failure, brain damage, and other 
health effects that may remain unseen. When viewed in a framework of violence, the perpetrators 
of chemical exposure are typically corporations, whose profits are intimately tied to the 
production and sale of these substances. Examples of this type of violence include the continual 
sale of tetraethyl lead (TEL) in gasoline, the ongoing production of asbestos, the use of certain 
phthalates in children’s products, or the dumping of mercury, chromium, arsenic, and other 
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forms of industrial waste. In all of these cases, the scientific understanding of the hazards 
associated with exposure has been thoroughly established, yet corporations and their industry 
groups have mounted extensive campaigns to obfuscate the science, prevent regulation, escape 
culpability, and allow them to continue operating on a basis of willful ignorance. 
 
Exposure to many industrial chemicals leads to negative health consequences that may only 
emerge decades later or in the development of subsequent generations as the result of genetic or 
epigenetic damage. While traditional forms of violence are typically regarded as being contained 
and bounded within a certain period of time, slow violence occurs as a longer process, the 
consequences of which exist very long or even unbounded timeframe. While the slow nature 
makes it difficult to demand accountability and force action, it is the lasting effect of these forms 
of violence that make their study so important. Elaborating on what he means by slow violence, 
Nixon (2011) notes that the central characteristic that separates slow violence from traditional 
interpretations of violence is the temporal aspect. He writes, “we need, I believe, to engage a 
different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather 
incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal 
scales” (p. 2). When it comes to chemical exposure, the calamitous repercussions may involve 
such conditions as cancer, cognitive decline, diabetes, or other conditions and disorders whose 
slow and gradual onset makes the culprit impossible to pinpoint. Due to the complexity of these 
chronic conditions, it is often impossible to establish causation with any degree of scientific 
certainty, which is precisely why slow violence in general and chemical exposure in particular 
pose such a challenge to society.  
 
The following sections will provide a brief introduction to four different cases of chemical 
exposure that are drawn on in this thesis. In each of these cases, the substance was identified as 
being potentially harmful to humans, which sparked a regulatory process in which restrictions or 
prohibitions were debated concerning the production, use, or sale of the substance. In each case, 
industry actions that were taken to prevent, delay, or weaken regulatory actions can be seen as 
forms of violence, in so far as they exacerbated or prolonged the conditions of environmental 
exposure, damaging the health of those who continued to be victims of exposure.  
 
2.1 Lead 
 
Lead is perhaps the most widespread and historically ubiquitous chemical that has continually 
affected human health from ancient times to today. Perhaps the first human to document the 
health hazards associated with lead exposure was Hippocrates, who wrote ca. 370 B.C. about 
severe abdominal pain (lead colic) in a man who worked as a metal extractor (Rom &Markowitz, 
2007, p. 955). In ancient Rome, it is estimated that about 60,000 tons of lead were produced 
annually over a period of 400 years and was used in in a wide range of applications, including 
pottery, water piping, and cooking utensils (Herrnberg, 2000). By many accounts, the use of lead 
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in the culinary practices of romans lead to widespread lead poisoning, the most significant 
sources being wine, grape syrup, and preserved fruit, and as a result of their diet and access to 
plumbing, the societal elite and wealthy were at a higher risk of lead poisoning than plebeians 
(Gilfillan, 1965, p. 54; Herrnberg, 2000, p. 245). Some of the health consequences faced by 
ancient Rome as a result of widespread lead exposure would have included low fertility, 
developmental disabilities in children, and high rates of neurological symptoms and 
gastrointestinal issues. 
 
In modern times, non-occupational environmental exposure to lead has come from the use of 
lead in paint and the use of tetraethyl lead (TEL) as a gasoline additive. Concern about the use of 
lead in paint first arose in the early 20th century, when two Australian doctors identified a 
connection between lead paint and childhood lead poisonings and testified before the 1908 
Intercolonial Medical Congress that the continued poisoning of children as a result of lead paint 
was “certainly a matter which calls for legislative interference” (Needleman, 1991, p. 26). After 
a lengthy regulatory process, the first policies restricting the use of lead in paint were eventually 
adopted in 1922 in Queensland, with regulations in Europe following shortly after. However in 
the United States, the story of lead paint regulation spans over half a decade as a result of 
successful strategies employed a powerful industry that was able to delay regulation from 
occurring until the 1950s, eventually resulting in a federal ban in 1978 (Markowitz & Rosner, 
2000). As a result of their actions, millions of children and adults in the U.S. were continually 
exposed to unsafe levels of lead over the course of their lifetimes in what has been called a 
“silent epidemic” and a “public health tragedy” (Fee, 1990; Markowitz & Rosner, 2000). 
 
The use of lead in gasoline is a similar story. Beginning in the early 1920s, petroleum companies 
began adding tetraethyl lead (TEL) to gasoline in order to improve engine performance and 
increase profitability. For the next 50 years, the oil and chemicals industry orchestrated highly 
effective campaigns and strategies to prevent and delay the regulation of lead in gasoline. Even 
in the 1960s, as a consensus emerged on the risks of environmental lead exposure, industry 
groups continued to lobby politicians and challenge any studies or scientists that questioned the 
safety of lead. Through these and other strategies, the chemicals industry was able to 
successfully delay any sustained form of regulation from occurring until the late 1970s, 
maximizing profits at the expense of public health. 
 
At the beginning of the phase-out of leaded gasoline and leaded paint, the average blood lead 
levels of Americans and Europeans were staggeringly high. In 1976, average lead levels in the 
blood of U.S. children under the age of six were found to be 16.5 μg/dL (Kovarik, 2005, p. 394). 
To put this in perspective, more recent studies have established that intellectual deficits begin to 
appear with blood lead levels of 7.5 μg/dL, and substantial damage to reproductive, 
cardiovascular, and immune systems begin at 10 μg/dL (Lanphear et al., 2005; Mushak, 2011). 
Following regulatory actions, lead blood levels across the country fell substantially, arguably 
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contributing to increases in average human intelligence and decreases in violent crime (Reyes & 
Wolpaw, 2007; Lanphear et al., 2005). However despite complete bans on leaded gasoline by US 
regulators in 1996, and by the EU in 2000, oil companies have continued to sell leaded gasoline 
in some developing countries, where to this day, communities still suffer from the effects of lead 
exposure (Cooper, 2011). 
 
The slow violence that occurs as the result of lead exposure can span a whole lifetime, leading to 
quantitatively measurable losses in quality of life. Based on the model of the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), if a child between the ages of 0-4 is exposed to lead 
resulting in blood/lead levels of 2 µg/dL, ignoring all other developmental and physical 
consequences, they are expected to experience an average IQ loss of 1.9 points, reducing lifetime 
earnings potential by 3.3% (Miller & Bhattacharya, 2013). However long term quality of life 
losses caused by sequelae such as habitual irritability, reproductive damage, learning disabilities 
and behavioral disabilities can also result.  
 
2.2 Asbestos  
 
Slow violence also provides a fitting framework for understanding the effects of asbestos 
exposure. When individuals are exposed to asbestos fibers, the respiratory problems associated 
with that exposure typically emerge only decades later. The most common disease resulting from 
environmental exposure to asbestos dust is mesothelioma, a type of cancer that affects the lining 
of the lungs and other organs. The latency period between initial exposure and the development 
of mesothelioma is typically between 12 and 20 years, although some cases may only emerge 40 
or 50 years or longer after exposure has taken place (Berry et al., 2012). Asbestosis, a condition 
characterized by scarring and inflammation of the lungs, typically manifests itself about 15 years 
after exposure, with peak deaths occurring 40-45 years after initial exposure, while other types of 
cancer caused by asbestos exposure have latency periods of between two and four decades 
(Selikoff et al., 1980). 
 
The harmful effects of asbestos were first recognized in early 20th century, and some of the first 
reports documenting harm came from factory inspectors in Britain and France (Murray, 1990). 
By the 1930’s a large number of studies had documented the harmful effects of asbestos 
exposure and the existence of asbestosis as an occupational disease among workers in the 
asbestos industries (McCulloch, 2005, p. 401; Ross & Nolan, 2003, p. 453; Murray, 1990, p. 
362). As a result of these studies the first government efforts to regulate exposure to asbestos 
were launched in England in 1931 (Wikeley, 1992). Facing an existential threat, the asbestos 
industry successfully waged a lengthy campaign to fight for its survival. By controlling and 
dominating scientific research on asbestos, the industry was about to prevent widespread 
awareness of asbestos related diseases until the 1960s (Wikeley, 1992, p. 374; Murray, 1988, p. 
2; Egilman & Billings, 2005). By insisting that scientific certainty be a prerequisite for 
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regulatory decisionmaking, and by hiring conservative scientists that would err on the side of 
uncertainty, industry executives were able to successfully parry substantial regulatory efforts, 
and asbestos use and production continues in countries around the world even to this day. 
 
Kazan-Allen (2005) show that global asbestos use is directly correlated with the incidence of 
asbestos related diseases, and suggests that global asbestos producers have shifted their markets 
to developing countries, where regulations are either non-exist or easier to manipulate. As the 
global asbestos market shifts to developing countries, one can expect that the global burden of 
asbestos related diseases will follow. The World Health Organization estimates that today, about 
125 million people are exposed to asbestos in their workplace, and that each year asbestos 
exposure is responsible for 107,000 deaths (WHO, 2014). Again, these deaths should not be 
regarded as a side effect to a lack of scientific understanding, nor as a consequence of industrial 
progress. Rather, the deaths of these victims should be placed at the feet of the global asbestos 
industry, whose strategies to obfuscate science and obstruct regulatory action amount to a form 
of slow violence that continues to threaten individuals around the world.  
 
2.3 Benzene 
 
Benzene is a rather elegant molecule, composed of a ring of six carbon atoms, each attached to a 
single hydrogen atom. Industrial production of benzene began in the mid-19th century, and 
although its primary application is as a solvent, it was also central to one of the first processes 
used to decaffeinate coffee (Katz, 1987). Since then, it has become a major industrial chemical, 
and is widely used as a precursor for the synthesis of other chemical substances. The story of 
benzene regulation follows a similar path as both asbestos and lead. Although the negative health 
effects of exposure were established in the early 20th century, regulation has moved forward at a 
snail's pace. 
 
The toxicity of benzene was first documented in the bicycle tire industry in the late 1800s, but 
did not receive substantial attention until the 1922 publication of Alice Hamilton’s work The 
Growing Menace of Benzene (Benzol) Poisoning in American Industry (Paustenbach et al. 1993). 
Hamilton found that benzene exposure caused chronic blood conditions that were later found to 
be the result of severe bone marrow damage. The first record of cancer (leukemia) caused by 
benzene exposure was recorded in France in 1928, and subsequent studies have causatively 
linked exposure with multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute and chronic 
lymphomatic leukemia, chronic myelogenous leukemia, and lung cancers (Graham et al., 1991, 
p. 120; Huff, 2007, p.4).  
 
The chemicals industry had known about the health hazards and risks posed by exposure from 
early on, and both a 1948 American Petroleum Institute study and a 1958 study from the Esso 
Oil Medical Research Division came to the conclusion that there was no such thing as safe 
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exposure to Benzene (Clinton 1948; Moyers et al. 2001). However, rather than take responsible 
action, the chemicals industry conducted a campaign of obfuscation, suppression and denial, 
asserting that there was no justification to reduce worker exposure or address environmental 
contamination. After US regulators set an occupational exposure limit of 1ppm in 1977 and 
1978, the chemicals industry sued the agency, entering into an adversarial series of legal battles 
(Infante, 2001). Despite assertions by their own scientists that there was such thing as a safe level 
of exposure, industry lawyers successfully convinced courts otherwise, resulting in the so-called 
Benzene Decision, which greatly weakened the power of regulatory agencies in the US to create 
occupational health and safety standards for chemical exposure (Infante, 2001, p. 39; Markowitz 
& Rosner, 2013, p. 225; Sullivan, 1981).  
 
Today, the World Health Organization (WHO) includes benzene as one it’s “10 chemicals of 
major public concern,” and the most common routes of environmental exposure are through 
automobile exhaust, industrial emissions, cigarette smoke, and off-gassing from building 
materials (WHO, 1993). Other sources of exposure include groundwater contamination and 
consumer products. However the most vulnerable populations are factory workers who remain 
inadequately protected under occupational health codes that in many cases have remained 
unchanged since the 1980s as a result of industry roadblocks. Again, the harmful effects of 
benzene exposure, including increased cases of childhood and adult leukemia, can be seen as 
slow violence caused as the direct result of unethical actions taken by the chemicals industry to 
obfuscate the science, and to delay, weaken, and prevent regulatory action. 
 
2.4 PCBs and Dioxins 
 
PCBs are another class of chemicals that have been discovered to pose substantial health risks. 
From the 1920s to the 1980s, these chlorinated organic compounds were produced in massive 
quantities primarily for use in electrical equipment because of their insulating properties and 
ability to withstand high temperatures. In addition, they were used as hydraulic fluid and heat 
transfer fluid, and were also used as ingredients in PVC plastics, paints, adhesives, and 
lubricants. It is estimated that the total worldwide production of PCBs (excluding the USSR and 
China) was about 1.5 million tons (Colborn, Dumanoski & Myers, 1996, p. 64). Today, because 
of their persistence and tendency to travel, these chemicals can be found quite literally 
everywhere, inside virtually all humans and all ecosystems (Koppe & Keys, 2001; Colborn et al., 
1996). 
 
The chemicals industry knew about at least some of the negative health effects of human 
exposure to PCBs since the 1930s. After three exposed workers died at a Halowax Corporation 
factory in New York showing severe liver damage, an investigative study confirmed that PCB 
exposure causes severe liver damage in rats, the results of which were presented at a meeting 
attended by all of the major PCB actors, including Monsanto, General Electric, and Halowax 
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(Koppe & Keys, 2001, p. 65). However little to no action was taken by these companies for 
decades, even though by 1953, Monsanto had known about toxic dioxins and dibenzofurans in 
their PCB products, and GE had documented 43 references on the health dangers and possible 
lethality of these substances (Environmental Working Group, 2009; Francis, 1998).  
 
The health risks of PCBs first came to the public's attention in 1968 as the result of a mass 
poisoning in Yusho, Japan, caused when a leaking heating pipe spilled PCBs into a batch of rice 
oil. Of the 1800 victims, the most common symptoms of exposure were chloracne, 
conjunctivitis, acne like pustules, swelling of eyelids, severe headache, swollen joints, feelings of 
weakness, and sweating of palms (Koppe & Keys, 2001). Out of 11 pregnant women, two babies 
were born stillborn, while the others experienced skin and nail discolorations and developed 
developmental and behavioral disorders. The long term sequelae that continued 10 years after 
exposure included a chronic eye discharge, neurological symptoms, general fatigue, poor 
appetite, chronic coughs, and chronic headaches, as well as the development of various forms of 
cancer (Masuda, 1985). As a result of the Yusho incident and increased public concern about 
PCBs in the environment, the chemicals industry went on the defensive, externally denying the 
hazards of PCBs, while internally noting that stopping the production of PCBs was not an option 
because it would cause “profits to cease and liability to soar because we would be admitting guilt 
of our actions” (Koppe & Keys, 2001, p. 67; Francis, 1998). 
 
To delay action on PCBs, the chemicals industry began a global campaign that included lobbying 
efforts, fraudulent science, and a strategy of denial (Environmental Working Group, 2009; 
Francis, 1998). However these strategies were only able to prolong the manufacture of PCBs for 
a handful of years. Despite the efforts of the chemicals industry, in 1973 the OECD took action 
to ban PCBs in open use applications, and national regulatory restrictions began in the mid-70s. 
Eventually, the manufacturing, processing, and distribution of PCBs was prohibited in the UK in 
1978 and in the US in 1979, with further international actions taken in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Koppe & Keys, 2001). 
 
Again, in the case of PCBs, slow violence can be found in the actions of the chemicals industry 
in general and Monsanto in particular. Despite the fact that Monsanto had long known about the 
harmful effects associated with exposure to PCBs, they continued to develop, produce, and 
market new PCB products while suppressing internal studies and commissioning fraudulent 
science. However as is typical of victims of slow violence, the vast majority of those affected by 
PCB exposure will never know that chemical companies are responsible for their cancers or 
miscarriages (Helmfrid et al., 2012). Parents whose children have behavioral disorders, lower IQ, 
and abnormal sexual development will not recognize that exposure to PCBs created these issues 
(Eubig et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2008; Osius et al., 1999; Vreugdenhil et al., 2002). Because of 
the slow, gradual, and often invisible onset of health effects, the damage caused by the chemicals 
industry’s intentional actions is not regarded as a result of violence.  
15 
 
 
 
2.5 Other Chemicals 
 
These four cases are intended serve as examples of the types of processes that this thesis hopes to 
explore. Every time that the chemicals industry has faced a regulatory action that would impose 
substantial costs for industry, they have taken efforts to counter it. The actions taken by the 
chemicals industry on phthalates, chromium, formaldehyde, styrene, mercury, and many 
different pesticides have also followed very similar paths. As Dr. Philip Landrigan notes, “It's 
almost inevitable that when a chemical becomes part of the political process that its regulation is 
going to be delayed. A chemical that has no commercial value is easy to regulate” (Moyers et al., 
2001, 51:11). Currently, EDCs lie at the center of one of the biggest battles ever faced by the 
chemicals industry, and much of the debate centers around bisphenol-a (BPA) and phthalates, 
two ubiquitous substances found in plastics. However many pesticides, herbicides, and flame 
retardants are also receiving attention for their ability to negatively affect the endocrine system, 
even at very low levels of exposure. 
 
3. Theory: The Regulatory Process 
 
Perhaps the most prominent definition of violence is that put forward by John Galtung (1969), 
the founder of peace and conflict studies, who wrote that “violence is present when human 
beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their 
potential realizations” (p. 168). This definition of violence is fitting for the types of damage 
caused by chemicals, as exposure tends to result in adverse effects on the function of bodily 
organs, including the brain, decreasing both mental and physical potentials among victims. One 
of the important distinctions that Galtung makes in his typology of violence is that between 
intended violence and unintended violence. In his work, he notes that in modern western society, 
guilt is something that is more strongly connected with intention than with consequence 
(Galtung, 1969). This distinction represents one of the central problems that exists in chemical 
regulation in so far as culpability tends to be assigned only once a certain scientific consensus on 
exposure effects is reached. Because of this, the chemicals industry places an extremely high 
degree of importance on the regulatory process in general, and the science policy interface in 
particular. In effect, the regulatory process plays a quasi-juridical role in determining not only 
how new scientific knowledge is applied to society, but also how society weighs judgment the 
behavior of firms in relation to that knowledge. In this regards, the regulatory process determines 
more than simple regulatory outcomes, but also how the line is drawn between what can be 
interpreted as intentional and unintentional violence. Because of this capacity for regulatory 
processes to influence both legal and social determinations concerning the line between 
accidental harm and intentional violence, the regulatory processes must be seen as more than a 
just a battle over substantive policy outcomes, but also as a constructive social process by which 
knowledge is formed and social meaning is created.  
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Abbott & Snidal (2009) provide a broad model for understanding the regulatory process based on 
five interconnected stages that can be described using the acronym ANIME; Agenda-setting, 
Negotiation, Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement. At each stage of the process, actor 
groups tend to apply themselves differently. In the area of chemicals, public health NGOs might 
be more active in raising awareness (Agenda setting) or critiquing corporations on their policies 
(monitoring and enforcement) (Abbott & Snidal, 2009, p. 63). Industry actors however are 
typically most active in the negotiation stage, where they attempt to exert influence over 
decisionmaking processes. On the other hand, government actors are most involved in the 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement stages. In this study, focus will be put 
predominantly on the first two stages of the regulatory process, where NGO actors and Industry 
actors are most active.  In major regulatory debates, NGOs and industry groups tend to form 
coalitions, typically resulting in relatively polarized fronts that take opposing sides in the 
regulatory process. With this is mind, it is important to acknowledge the different logics that 
motivate each actor group. When it comes to corporations and firms, the maximization of profit 
is the strongest logic that dictates behavior. In many jurisdictions, there exist laws concerning 
corporate governance that oblige firms to increase shareholder value, thereby limiting their 
ability to function under any other mode. NGOs on the other hand can represent a more diverse 
range of interests, but can be broadly seen as “value actors,” who are motivated by principled 
beliefs, values and norms (Abbott & Snidal, 2002, p. 145). Government and regulatory 
institutions are often viewed as mere arenas in which the interests of NGOs and firms clash, but 
in practice they are often influenced by the lobbying efforts of coalition groups, and may have an 
institutional culture that results in certain biases or tendencies that affect decisionmaking 
processes and policy outcomes.  
 
3.1 The Science Policy Interface 
 
When it comes to environmental policy in general and chemicals policy in particular, science is 
the language that is spoken by all parties seeking to impact policy outputs. In the regulatory 
process, actors use science in order to construct a compelling case in support of desired policy 
outcomes. However due to the complexity of the science necessary to inform the creation of 
policy recommendations, especially in the field of chemical exposure, the science policy 
interface is easily transformed into a battleground for competing interests to play out. In the 
regulatory process, the science-policy interface exists at the negotiation stage, and represents a 
major point at which coalitions employ strategies to influence policy outcomes. Van den Hove 
(2007) defines science-policy interfaces as “social processes which encompass relations between 
scientists and other actors in the policy process, and which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, 
and joint construction of knowledge with the aim of enriching decision-making” (p. 815). 
According to Van der Hove’s (2007) model, a science policy interface fosters a process of 
consensus building in which parties gradually find common ground, and reach agreement about 
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how knowledge should be interpreted and used in a policy setting. However, as will be shown in 
this thesis, when regulatory measures carry substantial costs for industry, these processes are 
often more adversarial than cooperative, and tend to play out in way that detracts from rather 
than enriches decision making. 
 
Many scholars argue that scientific claims are socially constructed, and that scientific studies are 
likely to reflect social values and influences (Jasanoff, 1995; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983). 
Constructivists tend to argue that the political and institutional interests of scientists and their 
organizations play a major role in determining how research is conducted and what types of 
results are published and disseminated. Furthermore, they assert that the interpretation of science 
is heavily dependent on social, cultural, and educational factors, such as disciplinary training or 
institutional affiliation. For example, in the field of chemical regulation, a German cell-biologist 
hired by a cancer research institute may interpret results differently from an American 
toxicologist paid by chemicals industry. Each different scientist, facing the same data, will 
publish very different results that support different conclusions and recommendations when it 
comes to policy outputs. As Clark et al. (2006) note, “science no longer holds the ‘numinous’ 
legitimacy accorded to religion and royalty.”  
 
Scientific claims, as social constructions, must instead be mitigated through social processes that 
grant them legitimacy and determine the role that such knowledge will play in society. Although 
the science policy interface represents a formation in which co-evolution and the joint 
construction of knowledge could result in consensus building, in regulatory politics, these social 
processes more often results in even deeper polarizations. Jasanoff (1995) notes that this can be 
partly attributed to the fact that regulatory debates are typically bound by time limits which limit 
the ability for groups to reach consensus, while also noting that “the stakes too, are often higher 
in regulatory than in research science, so that different interest groups have incentives to press 
for divergent politically congenial interpretations of the available facts” (p. 282). In the area of 
chemicals, these incentives are often tied not only to costly changes in business operations, but 
also to notions of culpability with legal ramifications that can span across the entire sector. In 
this regard, science-policy interfaces determines not just how science is used in policymaking, 
but also how society judges the past, present, and future behavior of firms. For this reason, 
coalition groups are unlikely to settle on a consensus, but will rather dig in their heels, and insist 
on interpretations of science that support their own agendas.  
 
Because of this tendency for interest groups to advance science that may favor a certain agenda, 
Van der Hove (2007) draws a distinction between curiosity-driven science and issue-driven 
science, noting that the latter tends to articulate findings in policy relevant knowledge. In the 
regulatory process, stakeholders tend to rely on issue-driven science that is often produced by or 
funded by stakeholder groups. Typically, this issue-driven science tends to produce knowledge 
that calls for specific policy outcomes. Curiosity-driven science on the other hand tends to be 
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much more cautious when making claims that support policy outcomes. Jasanoff builds off the 
same distinction, referring to the former as “research science”, and to the latter as “regulatory 
science” (Jasanoff, 1995; Jasanoff, 2011). In this binary, issue-driven science also tends to frame 
findings in terms of certainty, which, as Van der Hove (2007) notes, is “all the more surprising, 
since it is amply recognized (at least in scientific circles) that all scientific knowledge is by 
nature uncertain and that scientific proof is always provisional” (p. 816).  The tendency of 
stakeholders to advance policy goals through the use of issue-driven science framed in terms of 
certainty, inevitably leads to conflict. Many collections of case studies that examine the 
relationship between science and regulatory policymaking have confirmed that science policy 
interfaces represent a very hostile place, where debate and discussion tend not to result in 
consensus building (Michaels, 2008; Harremöes et al., 2013; Irwin & Wynne, 2003). Rather, the 
rhetoric of “sound science” and “junk science” tend to dominate the science-policy interface in 
the area of environmental regulation, whereby stakeholder groups systematically challenge the 
authority, legitimacy, and reliability of the science used by opposing groups. In regulatory 
politics, the science debate has arguably come to represent the most contentious point in the 
regulatory process.  
 
Jasanoff (2012) argues that many of the problems of environmental risk management are tied to 
the fact that regulatory systems have failed to acknowledge that both science and risk are social 
constructs. As she notes “consensus on such ‘facts’ as the risks of formaldehyde or DDT arises 
not from demonstrated deaths, disability or environmental damage, but from repeated 
confrontations among disparate scientific observations, their interpretations by experts and 
stakeholders, and the ingrained moral and social commitments of decisionmaking institutions” 
(Jasanoff, 2012, p. 137). Because of the complexity of environmental science and the fact that it 
is so easily deconstructed and debated, scientific findings can be easily skewed to fit the 
diverging agendas of coalition groups, thus resulting in a process whereby consensus is not 
established through cooperation and agreement, but rather through lengthy procedural processes 
characterized by conflict and disagreement. These systematic processes which have become the 
norm in chemical regulation are often excruciatingly slow, highly inefficient and extremely 
ineffective. 
 
Although the agenda-driven production and interpretation of science is used by coalition groups 
on both sides of a regulatory debate, the policy outcomes of such adversarial regulatory debates 
tend to favor industry groups seeking to weaken policy outcomes. Harremöes et al.’s (2013) 
collection of case studies on chemical regulation show that more often than not, regulatory 
agencies facing scientific controversy have tended to err on the side of industry, resulting in 
insufficient or poorly designed regulatory outcomes. Other studies that highlight adversarial 
regulatory processes have reached similar conclusions (Sass, 2011; Graham, Green & Robert, 
1991; MacGillivray et al., 2011). The persistent and insistent production and use of issue-driven 
science framed in terms of certainty has thus proven to be a very effective way by which to 
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ensure weak or poorly designed regulatory outcomes. This thesis hopes to suggest that these 
types of insufficient regulatory outcomes are not circumstantial, but rather occur as the result of 
established strategies that are intentionally employed by industry groups seeking to undermine 
regulatory processes. Michaels (2008) suggests that many industry strategies for navigating the 
science policy interface were first pioneered by the tobacco industry, which successfully delayed 
regulation and avoided victim compensation for decades, continuing to do so in countries around 
the world. The ability of the tobacco industry to inject issue-driven science framed in terms of 
certainty in all steps of the regulatory process proved so successful, that the strategy has now 
become a common procedure for industries seeking to delay or prevent the adoption of effective 
regulatory outcomes. 
 
3.2 Complexity and Uncertainty 
 
Complexity and uncertainty are the root of most of the conflicts that manifest at the science 
policy interface. Environmental issues such as chemical exposure represent societal problems 
that are inherently complex. When it comes to understanding the effects that certain chemicals 
may have on ecosystems or on human health, in most cases it is nearly impossible to establish 
causation with complete certainty. Due to the complexity of human biology in particular, it is 
very difficult to reach a strong degree of certainty in the understanding of how chemical 
exposure affects specific biological processes within the human body over a long period of time. 
To reach any substantial degree of certainty would necessitate longitudinal studies spanning 
years or decades. However such studies are realistically unfeasible, and as a result of the ubiquity 
of chemicals in the environment, establishing any sort of experimental control would be 
impossible. 
 
The US Center for Disease Control’s Fourth National Report on Human Exposure to 
Environmental Chemicals tested the level of human exposure to 212 industrial chemicals, 
revealing that all Americans are regularly exposed to a substantial number of different 
carcinogenic, endocrine-disrupting, and toxic chemicals (CDC, 2013). Due to ubiquity and 
persistence of a wide range of industrial chemicals, it is highly likely that there is not a single 
human on the planet who does not currently have trace amounts of multiple different man-made 
substances circulating in their bloodstream. With such a diverse cocktail of chemicals in the 
human body and varying degrees of exposure, it is nearly impossible to say with any degree of 
certainty that one chemical in particular may be the root cause of such poorly understood health 
conditions as cancer, developmental disorders, or endocrine disorders. Many health scientists 
have raised concerns about the complexities, synergies and combination effects that can result 
when humans are exposed to multiple different environmental chemicals at the same time 
(Weinberg, 2005; Meek et al., 2011). The ubiquity of chemicals in the human environment and 
the complexity of biological processes creates a situation where science is ill suited to make 
concrete policy recommendations that are based on complete certainty.  
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Industry groups seeking to prevent regulation or to absolve themselves of responsibility or 
culpability take advantage of uncertainty and complexity to carry out scientific engagement 
strategies that call into question the legitimacy of scientific findings. A compelling model of an 
engagement strategy based off complexity and uncertainty is found in Sass (2011), who notes 
that this particular model, referred to as “the four dog defense,” was first formulated and refined 
by the lead, tobacco, and asbestos industries. Under the model, deniability follows four steps, 
including (1) my dog does not bite; (2) my dog bites, but it didn’t bite you; (3) my dog bit you, 
but it didn’t hurt you; and (4) my dog bit you and hurt you, but it wasn’t my fault (Sass 2011). In 
all steps, uncertainty is harnessed as the central concept which allows for the denial that any 
harm has occurred. In the first step, industry groups simply deny that their product is hazardous, 
and may produce scientific studies that show that it is not. Once it becomes impossible to deny 
that a product is potentially harmful, a second step involves insisting that although a product 
could potentially be harmful, there have not been any instances of exposure. As Sass (2011) 
notes, “absence of data is often used as a reason to argue that there is no exposure” (p. 3). In the 
third step, industry groups may admit that exposure has occurred, but insist that the exposure 
does not cause any harm. In this step, industry groups may note that although very high levels of 
exposure may pose a risk to human or environmental health, comparatively low levels of 
exposure do not cause any harm. Finally, after the first three steps have run their course, industry 
may attempt to shift the blame, admitting that although the chemical may have caused harm, the 
victims used the product improperly, or were also harmed by other factors such that blame 
cannot be placed solely on the product in question. Again, in all steps, it is scientific narratives 
built off the complexity and uncertainty of exposure that allow for the model to be successfully 
employed. 
 
Coming back to the concept of slow violence, the complexity of human exposure also enables 
narratives of plausible deniability on behalf of industry groups. Of particular importance here are 
the long time frames that often exist between initial exposure and sequelae resulting from that 
exposure. The low level exposure to a particular carcinogenic substance may take decades to 
result in the development of cancer, and brain damage caused by an infant’s exposure may only 
become evident much later in life. When it comes to something like EDCs, sequelae of 
childhood or in-vitro exposures may not emerge until that child reaches adulthood. In an even 
more nefarious scenario, some effects of EDC exposures may only manifest themselves in the 
development of subsequent generations (Schug et al., 2011). In the field of toxicology, terms 
such as teratogenic (causing embryonic or fetal malformations), mutagenic (causing genetic 
change), and repro-toxic (having a toxic effect on reproductive processes) are now used to 
describe a myriad of chemicals whose range of negative effects occur along lengthy timelines 
and are not well understood.  Again, because of the sheer amount of chemicals in the 
environment, and sequelae timelines that can carry on into the development of subsequent 
generations, causation is something that is impossible to establish with any degree of certainty.  
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However even as scientific understanding of an issue improves, thereby reducing uncertainty, 
this does not necessarily result in a decrease in conflict or adversity at the science policy 
interface. Graham, Green & Robert’s (1991) study on the regulations of carcinogens 
formaldehyde and benzene found that over time, as scientific debate matured, and as scientific 
understanding of risks improved, there was no correlation with either increases or decreases in 
policy conflict. Rather, as evidence mounted surrounding the carcinogenicity of these substances, 
resulting in a relatively clear scientific consensus, regulatory processes remained mired in 
controversy and adversity. Jasanoff (2009) suggests that the prolongation of controversy leads to 
a polarization of science that highlights uncertainties and prevents conflict resolution. This is 
supported by Collingridge and Reeve (1986) whose study on the ability of science to advance 
rational decisionmaking concludes that science, when linked to the formation of policy, tends to 
find itself in either an under-critical or over-critical environment. As Jasanoff (2009) explains “In 
the under-critical model, a policy consensus exists before new research is undertaken, ensuring 
too easy reception of scientific claims that appear to support the policy. In the over-critical 
model, by contrast, political adversaries are sharply divided and scientific claims are subjected to 
heightened scrutiny by experts from rival camps” (p. 8). In the case of the over-critical model, 
which has arguably become the norm in the area of chemical regulation, it seems that new 
scientific knowledge and understanding, though possibly decreasing complexity and uncertainty 
from a scientific standpoint, may actually increase complexity and uncertainty from a political 
standpoint, thus serving to increase the adversarity between coalition groups debating at the 
science policy interface. What results are the lengthy and exhaustive technical debates that have 
become characteristic of protracted regulatory processes and do not result in improved policy 
outcomes.  
 
4. Industry Strategies to Counter Regulation 
 
In order to understand how the chemicals industry interacts with regulatory processes, it is useful 
to understand the makeup of the global chemicals industry. With global sales rising from about 
$1.5 trillion in 2004 to $3.2 trillion in 2014, the global chemicals industry has seen rapid growth 
over the past decades (CEFIC, 2016). Much of this growth has occurred in China, where total 
share of the global market increased from 9.3% in 2004 to 34.4% in 2014 when total sales 
reached $1.1 billion, overtaking the EU ($551 billion) and the NAFTA region ($528 million) 
combined. Large multi-national corporations are the biggest actors within the global chemicals 
industry, including firmly established American and European corporations such as BASF, Dow 
Chemical, ExxonMobil, DuPont, Monsanto, and Bayer, as well as many Asian corporations who 
have experienced massive growth over the past decade, including Sinopec in China, Mitsubishi 
Chemical in Japan, and SABIC in Saudi Arabia (Selin, 2010; Schultz et al., 2012).  
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Large multinational corporations make up the most active industry actors in regulatory politics, 
and are often represented by trade associations who manage industry engagement with political 
and regulatory forces. As organizational units, trade associations provide a number of benefits to 
firms who engage in political activities. In the context of coalition politics, they allow industry 
groups to coordinate strategies and create a united front from which to engage in regulatory 
processes. In addition, they act as an industry forum, in which the differences and disputes 
between firms can be settled within the organization, preventing these differences from spilling 
over into regulatory debates. In addition, the use of trade associations can be used as a tool for 
absolving individual firms of direct accountability for what may amount to unethical actions that 
are taken by the organizations representing them. In this regard, industry associations act as a 
sort of public relations buffer that helps firms to maintain their corporate image, which still 
providing them with the advantages of political engagement. In addition, they also allow for the 
coordination of industry-wide public relations strategies. . 
 
In the context of regulatory politics, trade associations bring together individual actors and 
organizations and catalyze the formation and development of a coalition group. For the 
chemicals industry, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) and the European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC) represent the two biggest industry associations that bring together 
individual actors and firms from North America and Europe and coordinate industry engagement 
in regulatory processes. While the CEFIC’s actions are mostly limited to Europe, the ACC, 
previously known as the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association (MCA) (1872-1978), and the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) (1978-2000), acts as a major international actor. 
With an annual budget of over $100 million, and membership of 150 firms, the ACC is the 
political powerhouse of the global chemicals industry, and regularly coordinates and employs 
complex scientific, political, and media strategies that would be unavailable to any individual 
firm acting alone (Goldman et al., 2015). In addition, ACC and CEFIC leadership coordinate the 
International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) which manages the actions of trade 
associations in 55 countries around the world and engages with international regulatory regimes. 
As a mature and well-coordinated sector, the chemicals industry is often able to exercise political 
voice “in concert” allowing it to act in a “cartelistic fashion” through which the industry can 
generate rents that would otherwise be unavailable to less established industries, such as 
subsidies, preferential loans, sweetheart deals, and a degree of influence over regulatory process 
that often borders on regulatory capture (Drezner, 2008, p. 50). 
 
This chapter will explore the strategies that are employed by the chemicals industry in order to 
prevent, delay, or weaken regulatory actions. As noted earlier, these strategies have been 
identified through a broad analysis of industry engagement in regulatory processes in the United 
State and Europe. Among the cases used in this analysis are the four examples provided in 
chapter one, including lead, (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013; Meiklejohn, 1963; Kovirak, 2015), 
benzene (Graham et al., 1991; Harremoes et al., 2013; Moyers et al., 2001), asbestos (Murray, 
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1988; Murray, 1990; Harremoes et al., 2013), and PCBs (Koppe & Keys, 2001); as well as 
industry efforts to prevent the regulation of DDT, vinyl chloride, CFCs, BPA, phthalates, and 
formaldehyde. Through a careful reading of the regulatory histories of chemical substances, 
many commonalities begin to emerge, and one finds that regulatory efforts tend to follow similar 
paths. By looking closer at the behavior of industry actors in relation to regulatory processes, one 
can identify a set of well-established strategies are easily adapted to different cases and are used 
by industry groups in a wide range of regulatory settings.  
 
Perhaps the most important observation made in the review of regulatory histories, was that each 
individual strategy could be placed into one of three different groups, each representing a 
different focus of industry engagement. The first grouping, “engagement with science” involves 
strategies used by industry groups to challenge the scientific foundations that support regulatory 
measures, while the second grouping, “engagement with the public,” is predominately comprised 
of public relations strategies. The third grouping “engagement with politics” is largely based off 
lobbying and legal strategies. It is important to note that each of these groups is heavily 
dependent on each other, and that no single set of strategies stands alone. The following sections 
will deal with each of these groups in turn, outlining the individual strategies that belong to each 
category of engagement and demonstrating the interdependencies and overlap that exist between 
each form of engagement. 
 
4.1 Engagement with Science 
 
As noted in chapter three, the first step of the regulatory process can be labeled as “agenda 
setting,” in which groups attempt to place items on the regulatory agenda (Abbott & Snidal, 
2009, p. 63). For industrial chemicals, this typically involves raising awareness about certain 
health hazards associated with exposure. This is typically done when an individual, group of 
scientists, or an NGO attempts to disseminate knowledge or scientific findings that question the 
safety of a particular chemical. As the first step in the regulatory process, this represents a point 
at which the chemicals industry may attempt to employ a strategy of preemption that seeks to 
prevent an item from reaching a regulatory agenda. In this regard, a common first step employed 
by industry groups is to attempt to discredit the actors and then the science that bring an 
environmental health hazard to the public’s attention. Should that fail, moving into the 
“negotiation” stage, industry groups may also employ junk science fabricated for a specific 
purpose, while at the same time suppressing studies that don’t support desired regulatory 
outcomes.  
 
The group of strategies included in this first section all involve industry engagement with 
science, and as such, take place predominantly at the science policy interface. In addition, most 
of the strategies laid out in this section are made possible due to the complexity and uncertainty 
that is characteristic of slow violence and chemical exposure. Because of this complexity, 
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industry groups engaging with science can easily warp and skew findings to support 
predetermined regulatory outcomes. In this regard, Collins (2010) observation is particularly 
relevant, that the traditional definition of science “just doesn’t apply in the rapacious world of 
chemical regulation. On this high stakes battleground, industry wields science like a weapon. 
Ponderous reports, inscrutable studies and archaic language are strategically deployed to baffle, 
deceive, outmaneuver and disarm” (p. 115).  
 
4.1.1 Kill The Messenger 
 
While “killing the messenger” has been a common response to whistleblowing activities for all 
human history, the first instance of it’s use by the modern chemicals industry came as a result of 
the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Carson’s work, which documented the 
harmful effects of chemicals pesticides, is regarded as one of the seminal works that brought 
about modern public awareness about the hazards associated with chemicals in the environment. 
Prior to the book's publication, there had been virtually no public knowledge of chemical 
dangers, such that the chemical industry was unconcerned about the dissemination of scientific 
studies that questioned the safety of certain chemicals, and even sponsored studies that brought 
the safety of their own products into question (Rosner & Markowitz, 2013; Daniel, 2007). 
However with the publication of Silent Spring, the industry underwent a radical shift in its 
posturing and began employing a wide variety of strategies and campaigns to counter the work 
of scientists like Carson, as well to reassert the safety of chemicals and assuage public fears and 
concerns about the safety of their products.  
 
Following the book's publication, representatives of the agricultural and chemicals industries 
systematically attacked Rachel Carson and challenged the credibility of her work, her 
personality, and her motivation. As one industry biochemist challenged “If man were to follow 
the teachings of Miss Carson, we would return to the Dark Ages, and the insects and diseases 
and vermin would once again inherit the earth...Miss Carson is a fanatic defender of the cult of 
the balance of nature” (Ros, 2012, p. 27). Ezra Taft Benson, US secretary of agriculture under 
President Eisenhower, questioned “why a spinster with no children was so concerned about 
genetics,” and said that she was “probably a communist” (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 146). 
Other strategies involved the questioning of her credentials, with one detractor accusing her of 
being a woman “with little scientific training who does not even have a doctorate” (Ros, 2012, p. 
26). However despite industry attempts to discredit Carson and her work, Silent Spring was 
successful in raising awareness about the risks associated with chemical pesticides and the 
effects that hazard chemicals can have on the environment, resulting in the placement of DDT 
and other pesticides on regulatory agendas.  
 
These attempts to discredit the messenger as opposed to the message can be seen as argumentum 
ad hominem, a logical fallacy that appeals to feelings, emotions, and prejudices (Mann 2015). In 
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the case of Rachel Carson, this involved harnessing deeply rooted gender biases and accentuating 
the fact that she was a woman. It is highly likely that in many other cases, these types of attacks 
have proven very effective, although because of the way that they function, successful uses of 
the “kill the messenger” strategy result in in a situation where regulatory efforts end not with a 
bang, but a whimper, making the study of successful implementation very difficult. Thus, most 
cases available for the examination of “kill the messenger” strategies are those instances where it 
was unsuccessful. One notable example of such failure involved attempts by the lead industry to 
use public relations firms and scientific consultants to attack and undermine the credibility of Dr. 
Herbert Needleman by accusing him of scientific misconduct (Needleman, 2005). Another 
example can be seen in the efforts of the asbestos industry to discredit Dr. Irving Selikoff, who 
published many of the early studies demonstrating the harmful effects of asbestos exposures 
(Bohme, Zorabedian, & Egilman, 2005). Secret industry documents that were released as a result 
of tort litigation found that the asbestos industry referred to Selikoff as a “dangerous man,” 
collected intelligence on him, challenged his medical credentials, and considered discrediting 
him by falsely portraying him as an immigrant (Bohme et al., 2005, p. 342).  
 
An additional form of “killing the messenger” involves the use of intimidation strategies, such as 
threatening legal action in order to stop scientists from publishing or publicizing their findings. 
In the US, filing or threatening to file “research misconduct” charges has become a very common 
strategy used by chemicals industry. Today, about half of all environmental epidemiologists have 
reported harassment by industry groups following the publication of environmental health 
reports (Shrader-Frechette, 2012; McGarity and Wagner 2008, p. 148). Other examples of 
intimidation strategies are widespread in literature on chemical regulation. Notable examples 
include Justin Lancaster’s work on CFCs (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), Carlos Santos-Burga’s 
work on butadiene exposure (Davis 2003), and Randolph Byers research on children’s lead 
exposure (Rampton & Stauber 2002). Mann (2015) refers to these types of actions as the 
“Serengeti Strategy.” Building off the metaphor of a lion hunting a pack of zebras, he notes that 
while it is difficult for industry to take down a whole group of scientists at once, it is much easier 
and more effective to target individuals using highly visible tactics that may intimidate or 
discourage other scientists from speaking out. 
 
4.1.2 Challenge the Science  
 
When intimidating, attacking, or discrediting individual scientists proves unsuccessful, a 
common next step is to attack the science. As noted earlier, environmental science and chemical 
exposure represent scientific fields that are inherently complex, leaving much room for debate, 
misunderstanding, and interpretation. It is this complexity and uncertainty that makes science in 
the field of chemical exposure so vulnerable to challenges. In a typical exposure study, there are 
a large number of variables that can be called into question, including experimental methods, 
models, instruments, approaches, sample size, duration, and interpretation. As Jasanoff (1999) 
notes “environmental science, in this sense, bears within it the seeds of its own unmaking” (p. 
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137). Because of this, science, in so far as it relates to regulatory politics, is best understood 
through of lens of social constructivism, in which the meaning and use of science are determined 
by dragging science through a highly adversarial procedure in which findings are 
methodologically deconstructed to the point where they often lose their meaning. From the 
perspective of the chemicals industry, the goal of this deconstruction is to be able to cast enough 
doubt on contrary scientific studies such that they can be plausibly accused of being “fatally 
flawed,” thereby allowing for an insistence on their dismissal (McGarity, 2006).  
 
Scientific attacks are present at all steps and levels of the regulatory process, beginning before 
the publication of the first scientific studies that question the safety of a particular chemical, and 
continuing on long after a consensus has been established. Corporations, trade associations, and 
industry front groups actively monitor scientific journals and scientists whose research may 
concern their products, and will often make efforts to attack scientific findings even before their 
publication. As a pre-emptive strategy, this often involves the use of negative peer-reviews and 
scathing criticisms by hired scientists whose goal is to discourage a journal from publishing a 
scientific study that can be plausibly seen as “fatally flawed.” Once a damaging study has been 
published, the attacks continue, and often involve critiques and challenges in the “letters” 
sections of scientific journals. Although the actual content of these critiques may be 
questionable, they are strategically formulated in a manner such that they provide a compelling 
case to those who may be unfamiliar with the research area (McGarity, 2006, p. 28; Wedeen, 
2009; Rampton & Stauber, 2002, p. 199). By hiring and paying scientists to publicly challenge 
the work of other scientists, the goal of these actions is to fabricate a sense of uncertainty, and to 
foster the false notion that there exists a substantial degree of disagreement among scientific 
experts that work with a particular issue. 
 
4.1.3 Junk Science 
 
In order to solidify the sense that there is a lack of consensus and agreement in the scientific 
community concerning a particular issue, a common next step of industry groups is to sponsor 
additional studies on the exact same topic in order to create a substantial volume of data that 
contradicts the findings of incriminating studies. This is done by using issue-driven science and 
studies that are specifically designed to support a particular policy agenda, in a process that is 
sometimes referred to as “policy based evidence making.” As noted earlier, science that is 
produced by coalition groups seeking to advance a particular agenda is often intentionally 
framed in terms of certainty, which only serves to further exacerbate the adversarial nature of 
regulatory politics.  
 
The inherent complexity of environmental exposure and toxicology makes it relatively easy for 
industry groups to produce science that is deliberately misleading. To this end, there is a wide 
range of procedural trickery that scientists can use to produce results that support specific 
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findings. Laboratories can, for example, develop an experimental design that will inevitably lead 
to preferable results or employ lab animals that are specifically bred to be resistant to cancers or 
other conditions. In addition, they can deliberately tinker with studies by lengthening or 
shortening experiment duration, or even “accidentally” contaminate samples or dismiss trials that 
threaten to produce unfavorable results. Although in many cases these types of deliberate 
manipulations of scientific studies constitute a breach of scientific ethics as blatant obfuscations 
of truth, they are not necessarily outright lies. In order to engage in regulatory debates, many 
powerful interests in the chemical industry have created or funded substantial organizations and 
research groups whose purpose is to produce steady streams of studies that assert the safety of 
potentially harmful products, and challenge any studies that might show otherwise. Bohme, 
Zorabedian, and Egilman (2005) refer to these types of tailor-made studies as “science to 
specification,” providing multiple examples of industry funded research groups who produce, 
commission, and fund science specifically designed for obstructive purposes.  
 
Much of the questionable science is created by organizations who may claim to operate as 
independent institutions, but are nonetheless financially dependent on industry groups. One such 
organization is the International Society for Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, which 
publishes the peer-reviewed scientific journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. 
Although it claims to act independently, the journal’s editorial board is comprised of industry 
lawyers and scientists, and the organization is heavily sponsored by actors in the chemicals 
industry (Jacobsen, 2005). Another such example is the American Council on Science and 
Health (ACSH), which is also funded by industry groups, and whose self-described mission is, 
somewhat ironically, “to provide an evidence-based counterpoint to the wave of anti-science 
claims that became the calling card of fundraising groups who were using mass media to 
promote fear” (Kroll & Schulman, 2013). 
 
While the use of ethically questionable issue-driven science represents a very difficult problem 
in risk regulation, the deliberate production and use of fake or falsified data is yet another. In 
many cases, industry groups have either themselves paid scientists to fabricate results or else 
paid third party groups to produce phony science for them. One prominent example of this type 
of fake science came to light when Industrial Bio Test Laboratories (IBT), once the biggest 
toxicology lab in the U.S., was exposed for falsifying chemical safety tests. Investigators found 
that the lab, which at the time conducted about 35-40% of all toxicology testing in the U.S., had 
regularly falsified data in order to provide the chemicals industry with favorable results (Collins, 
2010, p. 116). As one U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigator noted “they didn’t 
care about good science. It was about money. They really had what was almost an assembly line 
for acceptable studies” (Fagin & Lavelle, 1999, p. 34). In their investigations, evidence was 
found that Monsanto executives knew that their IBT studies were fake, but continued to submit 
them to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the FDA. However after IBT and other 
laboratories were found committing blatant fraud, there were no substantial actions taken by U.S. 
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authorities to further investigate the production of fake toxicology reports. A 1991 EPA 
Inspector General’s report notes that only about a quarter of all chemical safety laboratories had 
ever been inspected, and out of 222,000 studies submitted, only about 1 percent were ever 
audited (Collins, 2010, p. 114).  
 
A common and somewhat ironic narrative that is used by industry groups in the science policy 
interface is an insistence that policymaking must be founded on “sound science” as opposed to 
“junk science.” These types of narratives are typically employed after industry has successfully 
produced enough contradictory science to foster an atmosphere of uncertainty. Once a plausible 
sense of controversy has been manufactured, industry groups can insist that no regulation should 
take place until new studies have been carried out, allowing for an indefinite extension of the 
regulatory process. These types of strategies are employed at every step of the science policy 
interface, often leading to endless adversarial technical debates that are drawn out over the 
course of years.  
 
4.1.4 Suppress Contrary Findings 
 
At the same time that the chemicals industry produces science showing their products to be safe, 
firms also actively suppress other studies that might call the safety of their products into 
question. In many cases, industry documents made public as a result of tort litigation reveal that 
industry groups know about health and safety risks associated with their products long before 
these same risks come to the attention of public health officials or government regulators. By 
actively suppressing or hiding these studies, the chemicals industry has been able to extend the 
product lifespan of many damaging substances by years and decades, increasing profits at the 
expense of the health of those who face exposure. Some of the more notable cases where tort 
litigation has uncovered internal industry communications showing firm knowledge and inaction 
on health hazards involve PCBs, benzene, vinyl chloride, and DBCP (Moyers et al., 2001; 
Markowitz & Rosner, 2013; Huff, 2007)   
 
In the case of consumer and occupational exposure to vinyl chloride, a propellant in hair sprays, 
deodorants and other aerosols, after industry scientists in Italy found that exposure at relatively 
low levels caused liver cancer in rats, members of both the European and American chemicals 
industry went so far as to sign non-disclosure agreements to ensure that the carcinogenesis of 
vinyl chloride exposure never became known by the public (Moyers et al., 2001; Markowitz & 
Rosner, 2013). Despite awareness that the ambient air concentrations of vinyl chloride exceeded 
safe levels at chemical factories and hairdresser’s salons, no action was immediately taken to 
reduce exposure, and these studies were intentionally hidden from employees and the public. 
Rather, motivated by fear of costly tort litigation, the chemical industry quietly and gradually 
phased out the use of vinyl chloride as a propellant by convincing manufacturers to switch to 
alternative propellants without ever explaining their true motivations. Ironically, methylene 
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chloride, the propellant most commonly used to replace vinyl chloride, was later also found to be 
a carcinogen. By successfully keeping knowledge of its carcinogenicity hidden from the public, 
vinyl chloride producers were able to avoid both costly litigation and public accountability for 
the sickness and deaths caused by their products. To return to the concept of slow violence, by 
suppressing their knowledge, over the course of decades, an unknown number of individuals fell 
sick and died most likely without ever knowing that their suffering was caused by chemical 
exposure.  
  
However individual case studies can only demonstrate a small piece of much a larger picture. In 
order to better protect the public against hazardous exposure, the 1976 U.S. Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) includes a provision that requires corporations to report their findings to the 
EPA if they discover any reasonable indication that a chemical could pose a potential health 
problem, imposing a $6,000 per day fine if those findings are not reported within 15 days 
(Collins, 2010, p. 120; Griffin, 1996, pp. 56-57). Following a four year legal battle with 
Monsanto who was found to have hidden studies showing that their Santoguard PVI pesticide 
caused cancer in rats, the CMA met with EPA officials and negotiated an “amnesty program” in 
which companies that were currently violating the TSCA’s reporting requirements had an 
opportunity to submit their suppressed data to the EPA, who dramatically lowered and limited 
fines during the amnesty period. In the program, over 120 companies turned over 11,000 
illegally withheld reports concerning the adverse health effects of their products, with many of 
these studies dating as far back as 1960 (Collins, 2010, p. 121). Following the massive data 
dump, the EPA found itself extremely overburdened and understaffed to sort through the massive 
number of studies, resulting in a situation where the “mountain of studies remains part of the 
agency’s vast unexplored backlog of unscreened chemicals in circulation” (p. 122).  
 
As an alternative to suppressing incriminating studies, many corporations simply choose to 
operate under a strategy of willful ignorance. By conducting no toxicity studies of their products, 
chemical producers are often able to circumvent the problems associated with reporting 
requirements. Following the EPAs amnesty program, the NGO Environmental Defense Fund 
conducted a study on the most produced chemicals sold in the U.S., concluding that “even the 
most basic toxicity testing results cannot be found in the public record for nearly 75 percent of 
the top volume chemicals in commercial use” (Environmental Defense Fund, 1997). Out of all 
high production volume chemicals (produced or imported in volumes greater than 1 million 
pounds per year), the study found that carcinogenicity tests were missing for 63% of substances; 
repro-toxicity tests were missing for 53%; neurotoxicity tests were missing for 67%; immune 
system toxicity tests were missing from 86%; and testing for impacts on children were missing 
from 90%.  
 
By suppressing studies or willfully choosing to not examine health hazards posed by their 
products, actors within the chemicals industry are often able to prevent their products from ever 
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landing on a regulatory agenda and to ensure that the victims of their products are unable connect 
the dots between their sickness and chemical exposure, thereby absolving them of liability. 
Furthermore, by simply not concerning themselves with toxicity testing, these corporations 
ensure that they are not held accountable for any damaging health consequences that may be 
later connected with their products. In these cases of engagement with science, it is again the 
concept of slow violence that lies at the root of what makes these types strategies possible. 
Because of the long, slow, and often invisible onset of adverse health effects resulting from 
relatively low levels of chemical exposure, corporations are able to deflect culpability and are 
able to harness the complexity and uncertainty of chemical exposure to obfuscate the science 
complicating regulatory processes and deflecting accountability. 
 
4.2 Engagement with the Public 
 
The second group of strategies that have been identified in this study involve one form or another 
of engagement with the public. As mentioned earlier, the 1962 publication of Silent Spring 
marked a substantial turning point in the history of the chemicals industry. Facing substantial 
political and public backlash for the first time, the chemicals industry recognized the role that 
public fear could play in advancing government regulation.. Because financial and political 
influence alone were found to be insufficient for ensuring desired regulatory outcomes, the 
chemicals industry realized that they must also engage with the public in order to assuage public 
fears and minimize public knowledge of potential hazards associated with their products. An 
internal MCA memo dated May 1964 describes public fear of chemicals as a disease that will 
never be eradicated, noting that “it may lie dormant or appear from time to time as a minor rash, 
but it can flare up at any time as a major and debilitating fever for our industry” (Lane, 1964).  
 
The strategies that have been developed by the industry in the field of public engagement can be 
seen as two sided, involving both positive campaigns that foster a responsible image, as well as 
obfuscating campaigns that are designed to sow seeds of doubt and muddle public consensus 
surrounding risks associated with chemical products. In a presentation to the British Society of 
Chemical Industry, James Lindheim, the worldwide director of public affairs at Burston-
Marsteller, the world's biggest PR firm, laid out his recommendations for how the chemicals 
industry could engage with the public. In a 1989 presentation, he argued that the key to 
improving the industry's image involved the use of modern psychological and sociological 
research, suggesting that 
 
“The obvious, rational approach is not likely to succeed. . . . In fact, the research 
tells us that people’s perceptions of the sizes of various risks and the acceptability 
of these risks are based on emotional, and not rational, factors. . . . All of this 
research is helpful in figuring out a strategy for the chemical industry and for its 
products. It suggests, for example, that a strategy based on logic and information 
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is probably not going to succeed. We are in the realm of the illogical, the 
emotional, and we must respond with the tools that we have for managing the 
emotional aspects of the human psyche. . . . The industry must be like the 
psychiatrist: rationally figuring out how it can help the public put things in 
perspective, but knowing that dialogue can only begin with the trust on the 
public’s side that says these people are taking my concerns seriously” (Rampton 
& Stauber 2002). 
 
This section will explore exactly what types of strategies that the chemicals industry has 
developed in order to manage the emotional aspects of the human psyche, to control public 
concern about chemical exposure, and to ensure that there is no substantial public demand for 
regulatory action of their products. 
 
4.2.1 Building Public Trust  
 
After the publication of Silent Spring the industry began ramping up public relations strategies to 
try and counter the “disease” of growing public concern about the safety of chemicals. Following 
the publication of Silent Spring alone, the MCA spent $75,000, the current equivalent of about 
half a million U.S. dollars, to counter its message (Goldman et al., 2015; Cushman, 2001). By 
1981, the recently rebranded Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) was spending over 
$3.5 million on its Chemical Communications Action Program which was established because of 
“growing evidence that the public image of the chemical industry is unfavorable, and that this 
has negative results on sales and profits and government, employee, financial and community 
relations” (CMA, 1981, p. 5). Despite this massive spending on public relations, the image of the 
chemical industry continued to deteriorate, with favorable opinions dropping from 30% in 1980, 
to 14% in 1990 (CMA, 1991, p. 3). A 1992 survey of public attitudes in Australia concluded that 
the industry was associated with “pollution, danger, explosions and possible ill-effects from the 
use of chemicals and chemically based products” as well as ”secrecy, lack of public disclosure, 
possible dishonesty and lack of ethics” (Gunningham, 1995, p. 59). In light of this, the major 
chemicals companies acknowledged that their efforts to advertise their way out of their problems 
had largely failed, and that a new approach was needed to repair their public image. Furthermore, 
industry polling had found that the general public tended not to distinguish between individual 
companies and the chemicals industry as a whole, and that therefore any actions taken by 
individual firms would have little effect on their reputations (King & Lenox, 2000). As a result, 
most of the strategies that involve engagement with the public have been carried out by industry 
trade associations who are able to coordinate large scale sector-wide public relations campaigns.   
 
One particular strategy developed by the chemicals industry to counter their failing image is the 
Responsible Care program. The basic idea behind the program was to improve the environmental 
and safety performances of CMA (later ACC) member companies and to thereby improve the 
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public image of the chemicals industry. Internal communications from the chemical industry 
reveal that the program was developed in response to the “rising tide of environmental 
awareness,” and the rising costs involved with public relations battles over state initiatives such 
as California Proposition 65 and Proposition 128 (CMA, 1990a). Advertisements promoting the 
program listed as guiding principles “to make health, safety, and environmental consideration a 
priority in our planning for all existing and new product processes,” as well as “to participate 
with government and others in creating responsible laws, regulations, and standards to safeguard 
the community, workplace, and environment” (Environmental Working Group, 2001). However, 
when the program was implemented in the 1990s, the true goals of the program were related to 
public relations, with the CMA spending between $1 million and $2 million each year 
implementing the program at member companies, and over $10 million each year advertising the 
program (CMA, 1997). Internal communication showed that the intention of the program was to 
improve the image of the chemicals industry in order to achieve “a slowing public desire for 
regulation” (CMA, 1990b). Responsible Care can thus be seen as a public relations strategy 
intended to highlight corporate social responsibility, putting the industry in a better position to 
counter future regulatory threats. Givel (2007) reaches the same conclusion about Responsible 
Care, noting that this type of strategy first originated in the tobacco industry, and represents a 
situation where an entire industry “collectively engages in industry social corporate 
responsibility efforts in tandem with a deceptive and manipulative alternative goal of countering 
costly stricter regulation of the industry’s products” (p. 90). 
 
In addition to Responsible Care, which continues to serve as the chemical industry’s main 
platform for marketing social responsibility and improving their public image, the chemicals 
industry also regularly carries out other more traditional advertising campaigns. Some recent 
examples include the ACC’s “plastics make it possible” campaign, which was first launched in 
1993, as well as the $35 million “essential2life” PR campaign, which highlights the importance 
of the chemicals industry and is designed to show how crucial the chemicals industry is to 
modern life (Fortun, 2010).  
 
4.2.2 Industry Self-Regulation 
 
Although it is often seen as a mere public relations ploy, the Responsible Care program should 
be viewed as more than an attempt to try and build public trust. Because of the way that the 
program functions, it can also be seen as a tool through which the chemicals industry can take 
action on issues that may otherwise be addressed through a government agency, thereby allowing 
the industry to preempt stricter actions by regulatory authorities by developing regulatory 
measures on their own turf. In this regard, the Responsible Care program can be seen as a form 
of industry self-regulation, another strategy used by industry seeking to prevent stricter 
regulation. As internal documents at the formation of the program state “a general CMA policy 
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on voluntary development of health, safety, and environmental information will potentially avert 
restrictive regulatory actions and legislative initiatives” (CMA, 1992).  
 
The substantive part of membership in the Responsible Care program consists of six codes of 
conduct (community awareness and emergency response, pollution prevention, process safety, 
distribution, employee health and safety, and product stewardship), which identify more than 100 
specific management practices. While many of the codes parallel existing legal requirements, 
other codes go beyond the scope of the law in promoting responsible practices. However in 
effect, these codes amount to best practices that firms should voluntarily adopt. Although 
enforcement and monitoring practices are virtually non-existent, membership in Responsible 
Care requires that firms conduct inventories of their environment, health, and safety practices, 
develop plans to continually improve them, communicate them to external stakeholders, and 
train suppliers to meet similar standards (Prakash, 2000). As of 2012, the Responsible Care 
program has expanded to include chemical industry associations from 55 countries, involving all 
of the biggest actors of the global chemicals industry (ICCA, 2012). As such, Responsible Care 
can also be seen as a global forum connecting the chemicals industry and enabling better 
coordination of efforts and strategies for industry engagement.  
 
Glachant (2007) theorizes that companies join self-regulation programs without any actual 
intention of meeting program commitments, doing so rather to postpone legislative intervention. 
Under this model, regulators agree to postpone regulatory efforts under an agreement that action 
will be taken under a self-regulation program, however firms will fail to comply because impacts 
are not immediately observable and enforcement mechanisms do not exist. On the other hand, 
regulators may approve of self-regulation programs because they believe that the courses of 
action voluntarily taken by firms may be more expedient or result in better outcomes than could 
be achieved through adversarial regulatory proceedings. Empirical studies that analyze the 
impacts of Responsible Care have supported these theories, showing that on the whole, 
participants actually display worse environmental performance than non-participants. While 
King & Lenox (2000) find that Responsible Care members actually have slower rates of 
improvement in environmental performance compared to non-members, Gamper-Rabindran & 
Finger (2013) show that Responsible Care participants pollute more than non-participants, and 
that membership in Responsible Care is associated with a 15.9% increase in pollution. These 
findings suggest that the true purpose behind Responsible Care is not an altruistic attempt to 
improve the environmental, health, or safety track records of the chemicals industry, but is rather 
a public relations strategy designed to improve public perception of the industry and therefore 
reduce public pressure for stricter regulation. However since its implementation in the 90s, it has 
also expanded and grown into a platform for industry self-regulation as a way to prevent or delay 
governmental regulation. Al Meyerhoff, a former lawyer with the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC), accentuates the fact that CMA action on self-regulation is based on pure self-
interest, noting that “It’s an attempt to preempt effective government. It’s an attempt to try to 
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stop the government from doing its job by doing half-baked measures and then claiming that 
we’re protecting the public” (Moyers et al., 2001). 
 
4.2.3 Corporate Front Groups 
 
In an attempt to drown out the voices of legitimate scientists and organizations who concern 
themselves with chemical exposure, another interesting strategy of industry groups has been to 
create substantial amounts of corporate front groups. These organizations, advocacy groups, and 
news outlets tend to have authoritative soundings names, and work together as a decentralized 
force that aims to obfuscate real and legitimate scientific work done by legitimate organizations. 
Oreskes and Conway (2010) document an extensive network of pseudo-scientific anti-climate 
change organizations funded by the fossil fuels industry, and refer to these largely theatrical 
structures as a “Potemkin Village” of anti-scientific disinformation. The role of these corporate 
front groups is typically twofold, the first involving public information and engagement with the 
media, and the second involving lobbying and direct engagement in regulatory politics.  
 
The fossil fuels industry in particular has achieved a strong degree of success in using networks 
of front groups to spread disinformation and promote climate change denialism, such that the 
rejection of anthropogenic climate change has become a popular platform among conservative 
politicians in the U.S. (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). While the chemicals industry has not yet 
achieved the same degree of success, they do manage a similar network of front groups that are 
designed to look like legitimate NGOs, but in reality are front groups funded by industry. These 
types of organizations can be seen as artificial grassroots coalitions manufactured by 
corporations that allow corporations to drive and influence regulatory debate from “behind a 
cover of community concern” (Beder, 1998; Bohme et al., 2005) Megalli & Friedman (1991) 
show that major chemicals companies are substantial funders of corporate front groups, 
including the Dow Chemical Company, DuPont, Mobil, Monsanto, Exxon, Union Carbide, 
Pfizer, and others. Beder (1998) notes that these groups typically have names that are intended to 
disguise their true goals, such as the Alliance to Keep Americans Working, the Alliance for 
Responsible CFC Policy, and Citizens for a Sound Economy. Because of their attempt to mimic 
grassroots campaigns, Boehme et al. (2005) refer to these groups as “astroturf” (p. 344). 
 
Because many of these organizations operate through complex chains of funding provided by 
individual donors and foundations, it is often difficult to track the exact sources of funding that 
make these front groups possible. One example of such is the website SafeChemicalPolicy.org, 
which claims to offer consumers “a balanced, science-based understanding of these issues, 
revealing why we don’t need to fear modern technologies.” The website goes on to assert that “in 
fact, we should fear the campaigns to ban, regulate, or otherwise deprive consumers of the 
benefits associated with modern technologies that clean our water, help produce or preserve our 
food, sanitize our hospitals, make our medicines, and reduce risks associated with dangerous 
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pests.” The website was created as a project of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, whose 
finances have been found to come from industry groups, including major actors within the 
chemicals industry (Desmog, 2016). Other notable examples of front groups whose finances can 
be connected with the chemicals industry include the Frontiers of Freedom Foundation, the 
Reason Foundation, Sense about Science, and the Independent Women’s Forum.  
 
Both Beder (1998) and Bohme et al. (2005) accentuate the fact that many PR firms specialize in 
the formation of corporate front groups, and that these firms can manufacture the appearance of a 
grassroots movement relatively quickly in response to any pressing policy issue. One firm in 
particular, Bonner and Associates, whose clients in the chemicals industry have included Dow 
Chemical, Exxon, and Monsanto, was noted to maintain 300 phone lines and a complex 
computer system in order to find citizens who would support corporate agendas, coaching them 
to contact their legislators (Beder, 1998). These types of strategies often prove highly successful 
because of their ability to diminish the strength of true grassroots movements by situating their 
goals in a framework of partisan politics. By manufacturing artificial opposition to grassroots 
movements, the chemicals industry is able to frame issues as two-sided, thus making it much 
easier to conduct traditional lobbying efforts. 
 
4.2.4 Sowing Seeds of Doubt  
 
The underlying purpose of many of the larger public relations efforts conducted by both the 
chemicals industry and the fossil fuels industry is to promote a culture of skepticism about 
science. These industries purposefully propagate scientific debate and controversy in order to 
make it seem like every scientific issue has two sides. By incorporating narratives of “sound 
science” and “junk science,” industry intentionally fosters adversarity in science policy interfaces 
in order to weaken regulatory outcomes. By relaying these narratives to the public, industry 
groups also take advantage of existing polarizations within society to promote a reality where 
science is debated as a partisan issue. Doubt serves as the underlying concept that fuels these 
attempts to promote a culture of skepticism. 
 
Here, Michaels (2008) work is particularly relevant, analyzing how the manufacture of doubt has 
served as the foundational strategy behind industry efforts to prevent regulation of tobacco, 
asbestos, beryllium, chromium, and diacetyl. The title of his book Doubt is their Product, is 
drawn from a 1969 tobacco industry memo in which an executive noted “doubt is our product 
since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the minds of the 
general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy” (Michaels, 2008, p. 11). 
Oreskes & Conway (2010) also place the concept of doubt at the center of their book Merchants 
of Doubt, which documents industry efforts to obfuscate the science behind secondhand smoke, 
acid rain, ozone depletion, global warming, and DDT. Nixon (2011) also acknowledges the role 
that doubt has played in delaying industry regulation, writing that “the spread of slow violence in 
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our own times has been exacerbated by a lavishly funded army of new bewilders, those doubt 
producers and doubt disseminators whose job it is to maintain populist levels of uncertainty 
sufficient to guarantee inaction” (p. 40).  
 
All of the strategies mentioned thus far, killing the messenger, attacking the science, using junk 
science, suppressing contrary findings, building public trust, self-regulation, and using corporate 
front groups, can all be seen as smaller pieces of a larger strategy intended to sow seeds of doubt 
among the public. By denouncing the work of “alarmist” scientists while offering a plethora of 
alternative narratives, industry groups hope to foster a sense of doubt about the potential risks 
posed by their products. By reassuring the public that they are a responsible industry that 
voluntarily adopts best practices, chemical firms hope to instill a sense of doubt that they would 
intentionally cause harm. By creating the appearance that there exists broad grassroots 
movements that supports their policy agendas, the industry hopes to spread doubt that regulation 
is necessary. This public propagation of doubt is again, made possible by complexity of 
environmental exposure, and the fact that most of the damage caused through chemical exposure 
occurs on such a long time scale that it is impossible to establish causality with complete 
certainty. Because of the nature of slow violence, and the very gradual and invisible onset of 
symptoms, it is already difficult for an untrained public to make the connection between 
environmental contaminants and environmental diseases. Sowing seeds of doubt only 
exacerbates that difficulty.  
 
One interesting attempt to spread doubt and propagate a controversy involves ongoing efforts to 
discredit Rachel Carson. Nearly 50 years after the publication of Silent Spring, front groups and 
pro-industry organizations began to carry out a string of dispersed attacks on Carson and 
discrediting her legacy, involving the publication of articles, op-ed pieces, and letters. The 
Competitive Enterprise Institute maintains a website (RachelWasWrong.org) that claims that 
Carson’s work on DDT makes her responsible for the deaths of millions of malaria victims, 
while others have gone so far to call her a mass murderer, comparing her to Hitler and Stalin 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010, p. 223). These continual efforts to discredit Carson and her legacy 
are intended to cast doubt that government regulators took the correct course of action in banning 
DDT. By overlooking the harm caused by DDT, and painting falsehoods, these attempts to create 
a revisionist history about Carson, one of the most influential individuals in chemical regulation, 
comprise an attempt to cast broad doubt on chemical regulation as a whole. As Orsekes & 
Conway (2010) explain, “in the demonizing of Rachel Carson, free marketeers realized that if 
you could convince people that an example of successful government regulation wasn't, in fact, 
successful - that it was actually a mistake - you could strengthen the argument against regulation 
in general” (p. 217). 
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4.3 Engagement with Politics 
 
The final set of strategies identified in this thesis involve engagement with political systems and 
governance structures. Here, industry engagement is either cooperative or adversarial. In 
cooperative engagement, the chemicals industry relies on a wide set of lobbying strategies in 
order to maximize industry influence over regulatory processes. In adversarial engagement, 
industry forces rely on legal teams to employ a vast range of legal and procedural tools to delay 
and fight against forces that advocate for stricter regulatory outcomes.  
 
4.3.1 Lobbying 
 
Perhaps the most potent strategy employed by the chemicals industry is that of lobbying. 
Lobbyists, by most definitions, are intended to serve as information brokers who understand both 
complicated technical matters and legislative systems, and are able to assist elected officials in 
the formulation of policy. Because of the broad range of policy issues that elected officials are 
called to weigh judgment on, the purpose of lobbying is to helping legislators to understand the 
details of a complex policy issue, while at the same time advising them how to proceed. U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy explained lobbyists as “expert technicians and capable of explaining 
complex and difficult subjects in a clear, understandable fashion. They engage in personal 
discussions with Members of Congress in which they can explain in detail the reasons for 
positions they advocate” (Weatherford, 1991, p. 119). Although the original intent of lobbying 
may have been to help legislators make informed decisions, lobbying in the U.S. and the EU has 
since evolved into a system where money is wielded as a form of power. 
 
When it comes to regulatory matters, coalition groups on both sides of an issue tend to employ 
lobbyists in order to educate policymakers and explain their positions. However in chemicals 
regulation, the financial resources of the chemicals industry are much greater than those 
available to pro-regulation coalitions which are typically comprised of NGO actors (Collins, 
2010, p. 97). Washington D.C. and Brussels have become the two corporate lobbying capitals of 
the world, where industry actors spend heavily each year engaging in regulatory politics. In the 
U.S., the Center for Responsive Politics found that lobbying expenses by the chemicals industry 
were $57.4 million in 2015, and $64.9 million in 2014 (CRP, 2016). Horel (2015) comments that 
although there is sparse access to reliable information about lobbying in Europe, the European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) voluntarily reported a 2012 budget of €40 million to the 
European Transparency Register, with a reported  €6 million spent on lobbying, although she 
also notes that “these self-reported figures do not represent true lobbying costs” (p. 8). 
 
In the United States, the current lobbying system is often seen as little more than a form of 
legalized corruption. In brief, under the system corporations and their political action committees 
donate to the election campaigns of elected officials, helping them to maintain their positions. 
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Once securely in office, these corporations will then lobby these officials to introduce pro-
industry regulation or to support their policy positions. Although there exist a number of rules 
concerning the registration and behavior of lobbyists, the system is full of loopholes (Kaiser 
2010). In Europe, the lobbying system lacks transparency, with no policies in place to regulate 
lobbying, nor a mandatory system for registering or monitoring the industry lobbyists.  
 
Most of the case studies analyzed in this thesis have shown that lobbying represents the most 
important strategy when it comes to achieving desired regulatory outcomes. However lobbying 
efforts cannot be understood in a vacuum, but rather as a very important piece of a much greater 
puzzle. Without the groundwork laid by other strategies, lobbying efforts would have no 
potency. By touting industry-funded science, lobbyists are able to convince officials that 
regulation is not necessary; by taking legislators on a tour of the “potemkin village” of industry 
front groups, lobbyists are able to convince legislators that there is public support for their policy 
positions; and by extolling the virtues of Responsible Care, lobbyists are able to convince 
policymakers that the chemicals industry is devoted to responsible practices. 
 
4.3.2 Exaggerating the Costs of Regulation 
 
One of the ways in which industry lobbyists are successfully able to prevent or weaken 
regulatory measures is by exaggerating the costs of regulation. To delay or weaken proposed 
regulation, industry groups will develop studies that show that the economic costs associated 
with the proposed measures are unbearable or that they do not outweigh the benefits. In this 
regard, risk regulation based on traditional cost benefit analysis places industry groups in a 
position of power as they represent the authority who can best understand the financial burdens 
posed by regulatory measures. As a result, industry groups benefit by exaggerating the costs of 
regulation, and often employ narratives that criticize regulatory actions for being unfeasible and 
overbearing.  
 
In the regulatory process, these strategies are typically used in the final step of negotiations, 
often emerging at the tail end of long adversarial proceedings where other obstructive measures 
such as the “four dog defense” have already played out. Once a general consensus has been 
reached that the situation requires regulatory action, another process begins in which the 
substance of those actions are debated. Collins (2010), building off the story of CFC regulation, 
finds that even when negotiators agree upon the need for some kind of action, “rival coalitions, 
and the national policymakers within them, remain deeply divided over the relative costs and 
benefits of any given response. Blocking forces gravitate toward the position that the costs of 
regulation will be extreme, immediate and unlikely to outweigh any uncertain future benefits 
they might produce” (p. 191).  
 
39 
 
 
In addition to its use as a negotiation strategy, an insistence on the creation of new studies 
concerning feasibility, regulatory impact analyses, and cost-benefit analyses can also be an 
effective delay tactic. These types of studies can take years to complete, which gives companies 
valuable time to coordinate new strategies and contingency plans while continuing sales of their 
products. Furthermore, impact assessment procedures tend to favor economic interests, for the 
simple fact that it is difficult to accurately estimate the costs that are associated with slow 
violence, and the often intangible sequelae that emerge decades after initial exposure. As David 
Gee, a former senior advisor at the European Environment Agency notes “we know from the 
history of previous efforts to do cost-benefit analyses, impact assessments,  that they’re deeply 
flawed generally speaking because it is much easier to put numbers on costs of regulation than it 
is to put numbers on what are the benefits to society” (Horel, 2015, p. 12). 
 
4.3.3 Regulatory Capture 
 
The ultimate dream of the chemicals industry, and any other industry for that matter, is 
regulatory capture, where industry forces have gained control over a regulatory agency, giving 
them complete power over government regulation. In the U.S., it is surprisingly easy to find 
examples of industry influence that border on regulatory capture. In Europe, concerns have been 
raised about the influence of industry groups over various Directorates General of the European 
Commission, and allegations have been made that the current industry influence over the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) amount to a form of regulatory capture (Corporate 
Europe Observatory, 2016a). Although it is not included in this study, in many developing 
countries where transparency is lacking, the relative power and financial resources of the 
chemicals industry vis a vis weak government agencies make regulatory capture highly probable.  
 
Although it is likely that in many cases regulatory capture is achieved under the table, through 
backroom deals and illegal agreements, in other cases it is attempted legally through lobbying 
strategies and legal loopholes. One common strategy used by the chemicals industry to buy 
influence over government agencies is via the so-called “revolving door,” in which elected 
representatives and regulatory officials are offered lucrative jobs as industry lobbyists. In a 
captured agency, it is typical for workers to go back and forth between positions in the chemicals 
industry and position in government agencies. Goldman et al. (2015) finds that out of 71 federal 
lobbyists registered by the ACC in the U.S. 2013-2014 election cycle, 49 has been previously 
held government positions.  
 
In the U.S., regulatory capture has typically occurred under Republican presidents, who have 
appointed industry executives to top positions in regulatory agencies. One prominent example 
can be found in Ronald Reagan’s appointment of Anne Gorsuch as the head of EPA. Once in 
office, she hired industry lobbyists from the thesis, asbestos, chemical, oil, and automobile 
industries to run all of the EPAs principal departments, creating lists of EPA employees that 
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were considered “too green” and targeting them for layoffs and demotions (Collins, 2010, p. 90) 
During her time in office, she cut the agency's budget by 60%, and eliminated the office of 
enforcement, replacing it with a single “chief enforcement counselor” who was recruited from 
Exxon. Michaels (2008) also describes a state of regulatory capture under the administration of 
George W. Bush, arguing that “corporate interests successfully infiltrated the federal government 
from top to bottom and shaped government science policies to their desires as never before” (p. 
xi). 
 
In Europe, perhaps the best current example of what might amount to regulatory capture can be 
found in the EFSA. A large number of conflicts of interest (COIs) within the agency have been 
identified by watchdog groups over the past decade (Robinson et al. 2013). In December 2011, 
the Pesticide Action Network uncovered that 10 out of 13 members of the working group on 
thresholds of toxic concern were found to have COIs with industry (PAN Europe 2012); in 
December 2012, Le Monde reported that almost half of the members of EFSA’s working group 
on endocrine disrupters were found to have COIs (Benkimoun & Foucart 2012); in October 
2013, 60% of experts on EFSA’s scientific panels and committees were found have COIs (Horel 
2013); and in February 2014, 52% of scientists working on pesticides in foods at the EFSA were 
found to have ties with industry (PAN Europe 2014). Most recently, in May 2016, Barbara 
Gallani, a former lobbyist from the Food and Drink Federation was appointed the EFSA’s new 
Director for Communications (Corporate Europe Observatory 2016b). In the area of chemicals 
regulation, the EFSA has proven to be a powerful actor because of its role in providing risk 
assessment methodologies as well as scientific assessments for the regulation of both pesticides 
and EDCs. 
 
As noted earlier, when two opposing coalitions push for divergent regulatory outcomes, 
government actors are often seen as either mediators or mere arenas in which regulatory process 
plays out. However in reality, regulatory agencies are also vulnerable to influence by coalition 
groups. In the case of regulatory capture, these agencies serve as allies of the industry coalition, 
in which regulatory processes can be more or less seen as a mere charade in which agencies 
maintain the appearance of partiality while promulgating predetermined regulatory outcomes 
developed in cooperation with industry forces.  
 
4.3.4 Legal and Procedural Strangleholds 
 
When faced with a hostile agency determined to implement strict regulatory measures, as a 
strategy of last resort, the chemicals industry tends to draw upon a broad set of legal and 
procedural strategies in order to carry out complex legal battles that can span years or even 
decades. Many of the obstructive legal strategies used to delay and prevent regulation were first 
pioneered by the tobacco industry, and many of the law firms and legal teams that work for the 
chemicals industry are made up of the same lawyers and law firms who previously worked for 
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the tobacco industry. In the case of chemicals regulation, the ability for corporations to employ 
legal strategies against regulatory action are much greater in the U.S. than in Europe, which is 
reflected in the substantial number of cases where regulatory action has been followed by 
litigation. 
 
In the U.S., if a regulatory agency takes action to protect the public from some form of chemical 
exposure, they must be prepared to support that decision with a substantial body of evidence. If 
the chemical industry deems a regulation to be costly, they will take the matter to court in order 
to avoid or at least delay regulatory measures. Some notable examples of legal obstruction can be 
found in U.S. regulatory agencies attempts to reduce public exposure to benzene (Infante 2001; 
Moyers et al. 2001), lead (Kovirak 2005), bladder carcinogens (Michaels 2005), butadiene 
(Infante 2005; Sass 2005), and formaldehyde (Schotland 1997). Many of the obstructive legal 
strategies employed in the US are based off the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, which created a situation where judges must act as scientific 
gatekeepers, deciding which expert testimony is admissible or not. This approach has resulted in 
a situation where lawyers focus on minor flaws in the minutiae of individual studies, allowing 
the bulk of studies to be deemed inadmissible based on inconsequential errors, leading to a 
biased body of studies off which court decisions are made (Cranor 2008). McGarity (2006) refers 
to this as the “corpuscular approach,” elaborating that this prevents scientists from being able to 
rely upon a weight of the evidence approach most commonly used by scientists to weigh 
judgment on the risks posed by toxic chemicals.  
 
Due to the complexity of exposure science and the fact that most studies are conducted without 
thought to litigation or regulatory processes, there is an inevitability that minor flaws can 
commonly be found within the data of individual studies, resulting in many “honest” curiosity 
driven studies to be dismissed (McGarity 2006). On the other hand, the body of science that is 
typically used by industry groups in court involves studies that are often specifically tailored for 
use in court cases. In this regard, the legal strategies that are employed by the chemicals industry 
are carried out in tandem with scientific strategies. As noted earlier, a science policy interface 
can be seen as a social process by which the meaning of scientific knowledge is determined. 
Legal proceedings can be seen as the most adversarial form of a science policy interface, in 
which the goal of opposing groups is not to reach a consensus, nor find a deeper scientific truth, 
but is rather to “win” the case. Fischer (1996), describing his legal experiences fighting the 
tobacco industry, concludes, “law and science are worlds apart in terms of values that they hold 
and the rules that they follow” (p. 97). 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
As it has been shown, each of the individual strategies that have been identified and examined in 
this chapter exist as part of a larger industry playbook that has been revised and edited over the 
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past century to maximize the effectiveness of engagement in regulatory processes. It is important 
to note however, that the list of strategies provided in this section is not exhaustive, but rather 
represents an overview of many of the most potent and prominent strategies used by the 
chemicals industry in their past engagement with regulatory processes. The playbook however is 
constantly changing, as new tools, methods, and technologies make themselves available. Future 
studies that examine industry engagement in regulatory processes may benefit from a more 
chronological approach that examines how industry engagement has changed over time, or how 
individual strategies have been refined and adapted to fit new regulatory struggles. 
 
It is also important to point out that in this playbook, no single strategy is effective on its own, 
but rather requires the support of other strategies and efforts in order to increase its potency. 
Thus strategies that are employed by industry groups are typically carried out in a synergistic 
fashion such that they build off each other and combine in ways that maximize the likelihood of 
a desired outcome. The next section will take a slightly different approach, examining a single 
regulatory issue and showing how industry groups combine different strategies in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of their engagement and achieve desired regulatory outcomes.  
 
5. Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals (EDCs) 
 
As noted earlier, EDCs are a class of chemicals that have endocrine disrupting properties, 
meaning that when mammals are exposed to them, they have an effect on the endocrine system. 
The WHO and the International Programme on Chemical Safety define an endocrine disruptors 
as “an exogenous substance or mixture that alters function(s) of the endocrine system and 
consequently causes adverse health effects in an intact organism, or its progeny, or 
(sub)populations” (Damstra et al., 2002). The endocrine system is one of the most complex and 
least understood systems in the human body, and is responsible for regulating a vast range of 
bodily functions, including metabolism, reproduction, sleep, digestion, sexual development, 
growth, sensory perception, stress responses, and mood. The central organs of endocrine system 
include the testes, ovaries, thyroid glands, pancreas, adrenal glands, pituitary glands, 
hypothalamus, and pineal glands, and the central feature of the endocrine system is the 
production of hormones, which send messages across the various organs of the body. Because of 
the vast range of bodily functions regulated by the endocrine system, exposure to EDCs can 
cause adverse developmental, neurological, cardiovascular, metabolic, and immune effects in 
humans and animals (Schug et al., 2011).  
 
Much of the current scientific research on EDCs focuses on those substances that interfere with 
estrogen and androgen systems, and most of the current efforts to regulate EDCs are centered on 
chemicals that mimic these hormones. Perhaps the most controversial chemicals facing 
regulatory action today are bisphenols and phthalates, two types of ubiquitous substances that are 
used in the production of plastics. While bisphenols (including BPA) have been shown to latch 
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onto estrogen receptors, phthalates have been shown to have antiandrogenic effects. Other 
common EDCs in the human environment include DDT, PCBs, PBDEs, PAHs, and many 
different pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides.  
 
Scientists first began to understand the hazards associated with EDCs in the human environment 
in the early 1990s, and much of the current public awareness about EDCs can be attributed to the 
1996 publication of Our Stolen Future, a bestselling piece of scientific literature that 
demonstrates many of the risks posed by EDCs (Colborn et al., 1996). Over the past two decades 
however, evidence has mounted that EDCs may be responsible for a broad global increase in 
endocrine-related diseases and disorders. The 2012 WHO publication on the state of the science 
on EDCs documented a broad global increase in genital malformations in baby boys, adverse 
pregnancy outcomes, neurobehavioral disorders, endocrine-related cancers, obesity, and type-2 
diabetes, suggesting that human exposure to EDCs may play a substantial role in these trends 
(Bergman et al., 2013). 
 
In most cases, slow violence provides a fitting frame for understanding the long term effects of 
EDC exposure. One of the focuses of the WHO publication is on the lifetime effects that in-vitro 
exposure and children’s exposure can have on disease outcomes much later in life. The executive 
summary notes, “together, the animal model data and human evidence support the idea that 
exposure to EDCs during fetal development and puberty plays a role in the increased incidences 
of reproductive diseases, endocrine-related cancers, behavioral and learning problems, including 
ADHD, infections, asthma, and perhaps obesity and diabetes in humans ... exposure to EDCs 
could impair the health of our children and their children” (World Health Organization, 2012, p. 
7). Because the damage caused by EDCs occurs invisibly, and the negative effects emerge subtly 
over the course of lifetime, the effects of EDC exposure are typically not viewed as violence at 
all. Again, just as with the slow violence caused by human exposure to lead, asbestos, PCBs, and 
benzene, complexity and uncertainty associated with environmental exposure represent the 
enabling factors that have made it possible for the chemicals industry to wage successful 
campaigns to prevent, delay, and weaken regulatory action on EDCs. Due to the long time 
frames in which sequelae emerge, as well the complexity of exposure and disease etiology, it 
may never be possible to establish a causal link between disease and EDC exposure with any 
strong degree of certainty. The chemicals industry has taken advantage of this uncertainty to 
carry out an extensive campaign to fight against the regulation of EDCs, employing a very 
similar set of strategies that have proven successful in past regulatory struggles.  
 
The following section will explore those campaigns and strategies that are employed by the 
chemicals industry, unpacking the strategies used by the chemicals industry in their engagement 
with science, the public, and with politics. Many of the findings that are presented in this section 
have been identified through the work of investigative journalists, including Stephane Horel of 
Le Monde, Susanne Rust and Meg Kissinger of the Journal Sentinel, and David Case of Fast 
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Company. In addition, much of the information concerning the North American story has been 
collected through the author’s personal experience as a journalist, covering the actions of the 
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. In addition, the work of Goldman et al (2015) with 
the Center for Science and Democracy, is referenced with regards to the behavior of the ACC.  
 
5.1 Engaging with Science 
 
The campaign to manufacture a controversy and obfuscate the scientific field surrounding the 
effects of EDCs is so large, that many writers have compared it to the size of earlier campaigns 
waged by the tobacco industry. Nearly 20 years have passed since the publication of Our Stolen 
Future raised public awareness about the hazards associated with EDCs, however to this day 
there has been relatively few regulatory actions taken to reduce human exposure. Much of the 
inaction on EDCs can be attributed to a vast campaign of obfuscatory science that has asserted 
that these chemicals are not a risk, involving attacks on legitimate science and the publication of 
industry-funded studies and reports. As the scientific consensus has grown on the hazards posed 
by EDCs, so too has the industry efforts to obfuscate the scientific consensus in order to maintain 
a controversy regarding the science of the risks posed by EDCs.  
 
Vandenberg et al. (2009) provide a scientific overview of the various controversies that have 
emerged within regulatory debates surrounding endocrine disruption and BPA. In their work, 
each of the specific controversies that has emerged in the scientific literature is identified and 
described, providing reference to those studies that are central to the creation of the controversy. 
By digging deeper into the affiliations of the authors of those studies, one can find multiple 
conflicts of interest in their research. Some of the scientists whose research is referenced in 
Vandenberg et al. (2009) for fostering a controversy in the science of endocrine disruption 
include Wolfgang Dekant, who has received research funding from the ACC and many other 
industry groups (Horel & Bienkowski, 2013); Rochelle Tyl of the Research Triangle Institute 
who received funding from the ACC to conduct BPA studies (Case, 2009); as well as Calvin 
Willhite who has also been found to have ties to the ACC (Rust & Kissinger, 2009a).  
 
Analyzing the body of literature on BPA, Case (2009) identifies a total of 29 studies that 
conclude that the substance is safe, but that out of those studies 14 were funded by industry 
groups. In addition, 13 of the 29 studies were found to have been carried out using the rat strain 
“CD Sprague-Dawley,” which has been shown to be insensitive to synthetic estrogens. Case 
(2009) also notes that one influential study funded by the ACC and carried out by Rochelle Tyl 
used mice that were fed a specific type of animal feed that has been shown to mask the effects of 
synthetic estrogens. In another study, funded by the Society of the Plastics Industry, the scientists 
used DES as a “positive control” but found no effects from it, publishing their flawed results 
regardless. On the other side of the controversy, Case (2009) finds that out of over 100 
independently-funded studies on BPA, about 90% have identified adverse health effects at levels 
45 
 
 
similar to human exposure. Many of the industry funded studies on endocrine disruptors such as 
BPA are published in the industry controlled journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 
which is financed by the tobacco, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries (Jacobsen 2005). 
 
In order to promote a false image that a scientific consensus exists that BPA is safe, the 
American Plastics Council commissioned the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis to conduct a 
review of the scientific literature of BPA, resulting in the 2004 publication of the Harvard Center 
Report on BPA. At the time, the Harvard Center had also received financial support from the 
ACC, Dow Chemical, and the Society for the Plastic Industry (Vogel, 2009). Using an 
assessment framework developed by industry actors, the review determined that two studies 
funded by the American Plastic Council and the Society of the Plastics Industry provided the 
most relevant and reliant data, and the review reached the conclusion that there was “no 
consistent affirmative evidence of low-dose BPA effects” (Case, 2009; Vogel, 2009). However 
even before the results were published, four scientists removed their names from the report, and 
one of them later published a thesis that refuted the study’s conclusions (Case, 2009).  
 
In addition to funding the production of questionable science and biased scientific reviews, the 
chemicals industry also attacks other scientists in order to try and challenge their findings. In 
2009, the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for the Environment, commissioned 
the report “State of the Art Assessment of Endocrine Disrupters” published in January 2012. In 
response, the ACC funded a critique co-authored by five industry, and the European Centre for 
Ecotoxicology and Toxicology of Chemicals (ECETOC) commissioned a critique written by the 
product defense consulting firm Exponent (Horel, 2015). Similar critiques were carried out 
following the 2012 publication of the UNEP and WHO’s “State of the Science of Endocrine 
Disrupting Chemicals.” One critique published in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 
written by Exponent and funded by the ACC, CEFIC, CropLife America, the European Crop 
Protection Association (ECPA) concluded that the report “does not provide a balanced 
perspective, nor does it accurately reflect the state of the science on endocrine disruption” (Lamb 
et al., 2014). 
 
In response to the critique written by Lamb et al., the authors of the UNEP study submitted a 
thorough rebuttal, accusing them of “manufacturing doubt” and noting that the techniques used 
by the authors to attack the report are very similar to those used by the tobacco industry to try 
and discredit legitimate scientific enterprise (Bergman et al., 2015). In conclusion, Bergman et 
al. (2015) elaborate that the attempt to deconstruct the UNEP/WHO report was “not particularly 
erudite scientifically. It appears that the critique is not intended to be persuasive to the scientific 
community, but is designed to speak to bureaucrats, politicians and other decision makers not 
intimately familiar with the topic of endocrine disruption and therefore susceptible to false 
generalizations of bias and subjectivity.” These types of critiques are not intended to serve as 
actual rebuttals of the scientific findings, but are rather meant to obfuscate the scientific field and 
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create the appearance of a controversy. Other scientists are not the targets of these types of 
industry rebuttals, which are rather intended to influence the opinions of policymakers and the 
public. These critical reports funded by industry groups are commonly cited in materials 
produced by industry groups for engagement with the public and for engagement with politics.  
 
At the root of much of the current debate is the fact that EDCs do not behave like other toxins in 
the human body, such that traditional toxicology protocols cannot be applied to their analysis 
(Vandenberg, 2012). The two primary “controversies” that emerge repeatedly in regulatory 
settings concern low-dose effects, and nonmonotonicity,  Because embryo and fetus 
development occur under the control of hormones at levels in the parts per billion and parts per 
trillion range, studies show that EDCs exhibit low-dose effects at exposure levels much lower 
than those used by traditional toxicological studies (Colborn, 2009). Nonmonotonicity means 
that effects have a nonlinear relationship with the dose, which, in the case of EDCs effects have 
been observed in U-shaped response curves as well as complex multi-phasic curves, such that 
traditional toxicology protocols based on regular dose-effect response curves cannot be applied 
(Vandenberg, 2012). Because of the very fact that traditional risk analysis cannot be used to 
understand EDC effects, the chemicals industry often insists on its use. 
 
5.2 Engaging with the Public 
 
In the introduction to Our Stolen Future, U.S. Vice President Al Gore compared the book to 
Silent Spring, noting that Colborn et al. (1996) “takes up where Carson left off” (p. vii). Much in 
the same way that the chemicals industry mobilized after the publication of Silent Spring, a 
similar campaign of damage control was quickly put into motion immediately following the 
release of Our Stolen Future. Upon its publication, a substantial number of industry front groups 
released editorials, reports, and studies that attacked the work done by Colborn and his co-
authors. Elizabeth Whelan, president of the ACSH called it “innuendo on top of hypothesis, on 
top of theory”; an industry front group called Consumer Alert issued a press release describing it 
as “a scaremongering tract”; the Advancement of Sound Science Coalition held a press 
conference with 10 industry scientists who called it “fiction”; and the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute (CEI) released two studies belittling the “hypothetical risks to human health” (Helvarg 
1997).  
 
In the time since, a myriad of organizations and websites have sprung up in order to reassure the 
public that there are no hazards associated with common EDCs. Some of these educational 
websites include bpa-oalition.org, factsaboutbpa.org, endocrinescience.org, 
chemicalsafetyfacts.org, safechemicalpolicy.org, bisphenol-a.org, plasticsmythbuster.org, 
cosmeticsinfo.org, epoxy-europe.eu, plasticisers.org, dehp-facts.com, phthalates.org, 
flameretardantfacts.com, kidschemicalsafety.org and bisphenol-a-europe.org. On each of these 
websites, a number of which are openly maintained by the ACC, one finds citations and links to 
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industry funded studies that show no risks posed by these substances. In addition to these 
websites, industry trade associations and other industry funded organizations regularly publish 
reports and articles that paint a rosy picture of EDCs, creating a viable “Potemkin Village” of 
disinformation intended to convince the public of the safety of their products, and to foster a 
sense of doubt about scientific studies that show otherwise. In an article titled Green Tea an 
Endocrine Disruptor? If So, Everything Is, Dr. Gilbert Ross, the executive medical director of 
ACSH, accuses scientists who work in endocrine disruption of “scaremongering,” arguing that 
“since the definition of an endocrine disruptor seems to expand or contract to suit the agenda of 
the ‘environmental’ group seeking to target a chemical, and since I never encountered any 
scientist or physician who used the term to aid in the diagnosis or treatment of any human 
condition, I urge that it be abandoned” (Ross, 2015). Mother Jones conducted an investigation of 
Dr. Ross in 2005, citing his industry connections as well as his earlier assertions that PCBs in 
fish are harmless and that arsenic in pressure treated wood poses no hazards to humans (Hogan, 
2005). Similar articles written by industry hired consultants can be found all over the internet and 
in industry funded publications, downplaying the harm associated with EDCs. 
 
Documents that were leaked from a meeting of industry actors show that these strategies are 
indeed part of a larger campaign designed to foster a sense of doubt about the hazards associated 
with EDCs. At a May 2009 meeting of the BPA Joint Trade Association, the purpose of which 
was to “develop potential communications/media strategies around BPA,” the attendees, 
including the ACC, “discussed the need to be more proactive in communications to media, 
legislators, and the general public to protect industries that use BPA, prolong the life of BPA, put 
risks from chemicals in proper prospective, and transcend the media and the blogosphere” 
(Kissinger, 2009). In the meeting, the trade association agreed to spend $500,000 to study public 
perceptions of BPA and to develop content and outreach materials, concluding that:  
 
The committee believes industry studies are tainted from the public 
perspective...the committee doubts social media outlets, such as Facebook or 
Twitter, will work for positive BPA outreach. The committee wants to focus on 
quality instead of quantity in disseminating messages (e.g. a young kid or 
pregnant mother providing a positive quote about BPA, a testimonial from an 
outside expert, providing positive video, advice from third party experts, and 
relevant messaging on the Grocery Manufacturers Association website). Members 
noted traditional media outreach has become too expensive (they have already 
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars) and the media is starting to ignore their 
side. The committee doubts obtaining a scientific spokesperson is attainable. 
 Their “holy grail” spokesperson would be a “pregnant young mother who would 
be willing to speak around the country about the benefits of BPA” (Kissinger, 
2009) 
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While most would agree that employing a pregnant mother to help prolong the use of an EDC 
comprises an ethically questionable act, the proposal is perhaps more shocking given the fact that 
at the same meeting, industry acknowledged that their efforts comprise a delay strategy. 
Recognizing that BPA will eventually be regulated, industry representatives noted that “it does 
not matter what the next material is, there will be issues with it, and the committee wants to work 
to make people feel more comfortable with BPA and BPA2 or whatever chemical comes next” 
(Kissinger, 2009). These strategies to mislead the public should be seen as behavior that, in light 
of their intended results, comprise a form of slow violence. By intentionally deceiving the public 
about the risks and harmful effects associated with their products and by extolling the “safety” of 
a product that has been proven to damage health, the chemical industry directly profits from 
others pain. However because of the slow and gradual onset of that pain, they are held 
unaccountable and are able to successfully employ strategies that convince the public that their 
products are safe and have nothing to do with increased rates of asthma, diabetes, behavioral 
disorders, and cancers that result from EDC exposure.  
 
5.3 Engaging with Politics 
 
When it comes to EDCs, engagement with the science and engagement with the public can be 
seen as the foundation which allows the chemicals industry to successfully engage in politics. 
Without a myriad of controversial studies and general public apathy about EDCs, industry would 
be unable to implement successful political engagement strategies. The true policy achievements 
and delays that the industry has won have been achieved through an engagement with politics 
that is built off earlier engagement with science and the public. 
 
5.3.1 Political Engagement in the European Union 
 
In the EU, industry lobbyists have carried out an extensive coordinated strategy to delay the 
regulation of EDCs that is predominately based off the infiltration of regulatory agencies, and the 
use of procedural delay strategies. In response to the 2012 publication of DG Environments 
assessment on EDCs, DG SANCO tasked the EFSA with carrying out a rival assessment to form 
a scientific opinion on “the human health and environmental risks associated with the possible 
presence of endocrine disruptors in the food chain” in a move that Horel (2015) interprets as an 
attempt to take away control from DG Environment over the commission’s development of EDC 
regulation. In the working group that the EFSA put together to develop the assessment, 8 out of 
18 members were found to have conflicts of interest, and only four members had any research 
experience in endocrine disruption (Benkimoun & Foucart, 2012). However, shortly before the 
publication of the EFSA report, in February 2013, the WHO and UNEP published their 
authoritative EDC report, creating a tricky situation for the EFSA group. Working group emails 
that were obtained by Horel (2015) through freedom of information requests show that the 
WHO-UNEP report created a mess for the group. One message in particular noted: 
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“It is almost embarrassing to compare our current draft report with the WHO-
UNEP report. The issues the WHO-UNEP report highlight and takes out as being 
specific for [endocrine disruptors], we in our report are trying to downplay or 
even avoid, when WHO-UNEP comes to the conclusion that traditional risk 
assessment of chemicals is not fit for purpose to assess [endocrine disruptors]... 
we are exactly coming to the opposite conclusion...A straightforward killer 
situation!...I cannot see any other way out of this than we have to redo our report 
or at least significantly modify it” (Horel, 2015, p. 10) 
 
However despite internal misgivings, the EFSA report published in March 2013 still asserted that 
EDCs could be treated like any other chemical and thus be subject to traditional risk assessment, 
contrary to the findings of the WHO-UNEP report. 
 
After the publication of the DG Environment report, the EFSA report, and the WHO-UNEP 
report, DG Environment began to finalize their proposal for EDC identification criteria, sparking 
an intensive round of lobbying from industry. A volley of letters and reports sent from lobbyists 
of the chemicals and agricultural industry exaggerating the costs of regulation and warning of 
massive crop losses and severe impacts on industry called for an impact assessment, an 
administrative procedure that takes a minimum of 12 months to weigh the costs and benefits of a 
proposed policy. Meanwhile, another lobbying offensive focused on the negotiations over the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the chemicals industry hopes to 
use as a means to dismantle regulatory action by identifying EDC regulation as a technical 
barrier to trade (CropLife America, 2013; USTR, 2014, pp. 68-70; Horel, 2015). Another effort 
involved the distribution and publication of an editorial signed by 56 scientists and 18 editors of 
scientific journals accusing the proposed criteria of being “based on virtually complete ignorance 
of all well established and taught principles of pharmacology and toxicology” (Dietrich et al. 
2013). Although 17 of the 18 editors, and at least 33 of the 56 signatories were found to have 
industry ties to the ACC, CEFIC, and ECETOC among others, the combined lobbying offensives 
proved successful and resulted in the unusual decision to carry out an impact assessment that 
would further delay action on EDCs (Horel, 2015). A subsequent letter submitted to the EC 
president from 8 MEPs noted “This decision is surprising, as one would expect scientific criteria 
to be based on objective scientific studies and not on an impact assessment, which is rather a tool 
to inform political decisions” (Rivasi et al., 2013). Through this well-coordinated engagement 
strategy, the chemicals industry successfully won a procedural delay in the regulatory process 
that would span almost three years. 
 
As a result of this delay, in July 2014, a Swedish delegation initiated legal proceedings against 
the Commission, resulting a December 2015 ruling in which the General Court of the European 
Union agreed that an impact assessment procedure should have nothing to do with establishing 
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scientific criteria for identifying EDCs (Sweden v Commission, 2015). However in February 
2016, Vytenis Andriukaitis, the European Commissioner for Health and Food Safety asserted 
that regardless of the court decision, the Commission was moving forward with the impact 
assessment and that the scientific criteria for EDCs, the responsibility for which was transferred 
from DG Environment to DG SANCO, would be presented before summer 2016, nearly three 
years after the initial deadline. The publication of the EDC criteria on June 15, 2016 was 
received with criticism by NGO groups, including the Endocrine Society, whose press release 
expressed disappointment “that the Commission disregarded scientific evidence in its decision” 
and that the criteria “would result in very few EDCs being identified and regulated, at a high cost 
to the public’s health” (Endocrine Society, 2016). 
 
5.3.2 Political Engagement in the United States 
 
In the United States, the regulation of EDCs has also moved forward at a snail's pace. There are 
three different regulatory agencies who have the authority to regulate EDCs, namely the EPA, 
FDA, and CPSC. Broadly speaking, it is the EPA who have been mandated to develop criteria 
for identifying and developing regulatory measures to address EDCs. However nearly 20 years 
after congress mandated the EPA to begin screening pesticides for endocrine disruption, the 
EPA’s Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program (EDSP) has yet to have completed the screening 
of a single chemical substance. After it failed to meet statutory deadlines, the EPA was sued by 
the NRDC in 1999, resulting in a settlement agreement that a draft list of chemicals would be 
published by 2003, although that list was not actually published until 2007 (Tuller, 2013). 
Tuller’s (2013) analysis of industry influence over EDSP shows that industry representatives 
from the ACC and CropLife held multiple meetings with EPA regarding the EDSP rulemaking 
process during this time. Although Tuller (2013) is hesitant to acknowledge a strong degree of 
industry influence over regulatory processes and outcomes, he does note that industry groups 
“seek to benefit from procedural obstacles that delay rule development as well as from changes 
in the rules themselves” (p. 68). Currently, the EDSP is operating on such an outdated and 
ineffective set of protocols that the ACC has gone so far as praise the program for its “evidence 
based” approach, and it’s “high quality, validated screening assays and test methods” (ACC, 
2015). The Endocrine Society, an international medical association on endocrinology, disagrees 
with the ACC’s praises, noting that the approach taken by the EDSP would fail to identify 
dioxins or PCBs as EDCs, explaining that the data derived from the EDSP approach “will have a 
high probability of underestimating potency and may miss important effects altogether” and that 
“the risk assessment process will come to conclusions that could have negative impacts on public 
health” (Zoeller et al., 2012).  
 
At the FDA, debate has centered on BPA, which the agency has the power to regulate in the 
context of food contact applications, personal care products, and medical devices. Despite the 
growing scientific consensus on BPA, the FDA continues to assert that BPA and phthalates pose 
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no risk to human health, citing industry funded studies. Investigative journalists have uncovered 
evidence of a substantial degree of industry influence at the FDA, including a $5 million 
donation from a medical device executive to the research center of the head of an FDA 
subcommittee on BPA (Rust & Kissinger, 2008). Other investigations have found evidence of 
widespread collaboration between FDA staff and industry lobbyists, showing that the BPA 
industry holds a substantial degree of influence over FDA action on BPA (Rust & Kissinger 
2009b). This is corroborated by minutes leaked from a meeting of BPA Joint Trade Association, 
which confirmed that “the members are focusing on more legislative battles and befriending 
people that are able to manipulate the legislative process” (Kissinger, 2009).  
 
In contrast to the FDA, the CPSC has proven to be more resistant to industry influence, where 
most of the EDC debate involves phthalates, a ubiquitous class of plastic softeners. In 2008, 
congress mandated that CPSC oversee the formation of the Chronic Hazard Advisory Panel on 
Phthalates and Phthalate Alternatives (CHAP) to study the effects of these substances on 
children’s health. Throughout the group’s proceedings, industry actors repeatedly tried to exert 
influence over the process, submitting over 40 letters while requesting, attending, and observing 
dozens of group meetings. Despite these efforts, the CHAP published its final report in July 
2014, recommending the ban of six different phthalates in children’s products in addition to four 
previous bans already in place. In addition, the report noted that a majority of phthalate exposure 
results from diet and personal care products, calling on the authorities responsible for these 
exposures (FDA) to take action (Lioy et al., 2015).  
 
In response to its publication, industry groups submitted dozens of critiques and attacks on the 
science and procedural protocols, with the ACC claiming that “the CPSC’s flawed process is 
setting an alarming precedent that has broad and serious implications across multiple agencies” 
(ACC, 2014). Exxon Mobile’s legal team drafted letters and organized meetings with CPSC staff 
conveying a large number of legal “concerns” should the agency decide to follow through with 
the CHAPs recommendations to ban certain phthalates in children's products. Among those 
“concerns” were assertions that any rulemaking based solely on the CHAP report would be 
unconstitutional; that the agency is not legally bound to ban substances based on cumulative risk 
assessment; that failure to consider other relevant data would make a regulation “arbitrary and 
capricious”; and that the Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not permit the banning of a 
single substance based on cumulative risk assessment (ExxonMobil, 2015). While they have not 
yet pursued legal action, it is possible that following the publication of a final rule, legal action 
may be taken to stop or further delay any restrictions.    
 
5.4 Analysis 
 
In the case of EDC regulation one can see exactly how industry actors are able to combine 
various engagement strategies to delay regulatory action and ensure desired regulatory outcomes. 
52 
 
 
Although regulatory capture is a term that should not be used lightly, this thesis has shown that 
there is a strong degree of industry influence over EDC actions at the EFSA, the EPA, and the 
FDA. Trasande et al. (2015) provide a conservative estimate that the burden and disease costs of 
EDC exposure in the EU are about €157 billion each year, as a result of IQ loss and associated 
intellectual disability, autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, childhood obesity, adult 
obesity, adult diabetes, cryptorchidism, male infertility, and mortality associated with reduced 
testosterone. Linda Birnbaum, director of the U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences, notes that in the U.S. the costs could be even higher, as the study only takes into 
account those substances with the highest probability of causation, representing about 5% of all 
EDCs (Grossman, 2015; Trasande et al., 2015) However thus far, there have been very few 
concrete policy outcomes that have restricted the production or use of these chemicals, despite 
20 years of scientific evidence warning about their hazards.  
 
In light of the success of industry strategies, it currently appears that the regulation of EDCs will 
follow a very similar path that other chemical hazards have taken in the past. In the case of lead, 
regulatory efforts spanned nearly half a century, resulting in the grossly unrecognized mass 
poisoning of an entire generation. Today, it appears that the global regulation of EDCs may take 
equally as long, resulting in yet another public health tragedy. Just as the regulation of lead 
began in developed countries and has since gradually diffused to less developed countries, it is 
likely that EDC regulation will follow a similar course of action, with least developed countries 
facing the longest and most extreme consequences of exposure. Although it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, future studies may benefit by attempting to understand how global inequality 
contributes to unequal systems of risk regulation and how the chemicals industry engages in 
developing countries with less regulatory capacity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Since the industrial revolution, scientists have been playing a game of catch-up, gradually 
realizing the various health and environmental consequences of technological progress. From 
climate change to income inequality, the consequences of globalization are many, and most are 
exacerbated by the actions of corporations who are more concerned with profit than human or 
environmental well-being. Because of the often insular nature of major academic disciplines 
such as political science, business and the health sciences, many large societal problems tend to 
escape the degree of attention that they would otherwise merit. Because of its interdisciplinary 
foundations, global studies represents an unique field from which to shine light on these types of 
issues, bringing greater attention to serious problems of global proportions. 
 
This study has shown that in the case of the chemicals regulation, a process of learning has taken 
place in which the industry has improved and honed their strategies for regulatory engagement, 
resulting in a playbook from which coordinated efforts are employed in a synergistic manner 
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with a high rate of success. While chapter four identified and outlined many of the more 
prominent strategies employed by industry in past regulatory struggles, chapter five has focused 
on EDCs, showing how industry groups successfully coordinate engagement strategies within a 
single regulatory effort. These chapters have shown that by engaging with science, industry is 
able to manufacture a controversy surrounding assertions that their products cause harm. 
Building off scientific charades, industry can then engage with the public and manufacture doubt 
about whether their products are actually harmful. Finally, by asserting that there is no scientific 
justification nor public demand for regulatory actions, industry groups are able to engage with 
political systems to ensure desired regulatory outcomes.  
 
The success of this engagement has resulted in a situation today where it is incredibly hard to 
regulate harmful chemical substances, and where chemical exposure has become an inescapable 
and casually accepted part of daily life. Today there is not a single human alive on this planet 
that is not regularly exposed to a substantial number of industrial chemicals, for most of which 
the long term effects of exposure remain poorly understood. Much of the difficulty associated 
with chemical regulation can be linked to the complexity and uncertainty found within the 
science of chemical exposure, and most of strategies employed by the chemicals industry rely 
upon the fact that it is very difficult to establish causal relationships between chemical exposure 
and the slow and gradual decline of health that may emerge only decades after initial exposure.  
For this reason, this thesis has attempted to build off the concept of slow violence in order to 
promote better understanding of the types of damages that are caused by chemical exposure, and 
to increase public awareness and accountability.  
 
It is likely that in the distant future, scholars will look back on today’s world with a sense of 
shock about how long it took before society was able to take definitive action on an issue that 
poses such a widespread and unacceptable risk to human health. This thesis hopes to show that 
this delay is not the result of ignorance or apathy, but has rather occurred by design as the 
intentional goal of a global chemicals industry operating under a set of logics that places a higher 
value on corporate profit than on human health. 
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